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ABSTRACT 
 The	  Parietal	  Cortex	  and	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  Memory:	  	  Activity	  is	  Modulated	  	  by	  Changes	  in	  Task	  Demands	  
 
by 
 
Amy Lee Frithsen 
 
Recently there has been an increased interest in the lateral parietal cortex’s 
role in successful memory retrieval.  Several theories have been put forth to explain 
this phenomenon including the idea that this region plays a direct role in memory 
retrieval, temporarily storing episodic content until a decision can be made.  Other 
explanations report a more indirect role of the parietal cortex during memory retrieval.  
Some of these theories include modulations of attentional systems that may guide 
memory retrieval or representations of subjective awareness of one’s memories.  
According to these theories, parietal activations may assist successful memory 
retrieval, but are not necessary for it to occur.  Although this region is consistently 
found to be active when memories are successfully retrieved, these results were 
initially difficult to reconcile with reports from neuropsychology, which show a lack 
of severe memory impairment when damage to this region occurs.  These findings are 
specifically difficult for theories that assume this region is directly related to memory 
retrieval (i.e. the episodic buffer account), which assume this activity is necessary for 
successful retrieval to occur.  The purpose of the experiments described in this 
ix	  
dissertation is to test whether parietal activations are modulated by task demands that 
should not affect the amount of episodic content retrieved.  These task demands 
include modifying the way retrieval states are operationalized and varying the base 
rates of studied items presented at test.  Although these procedural changes should 
affect extra-mnemonic cognitive processes, there is no reason to assume they should 
affect the amount of mnemonic information retrieved.  Results from these studies in 
fact do show a modulation of both dorsal and ventral lateral parietal activations based 
on these procedural manipulations.  These results are difficult to explain with an 
episodic buffer account of parietal activity.  Instead, the results point to a more 
indirect role of parietal involvement in memory retrieval and are the most in line with 
the idea of this area representing the subjective awareness that can accompany 
successful retrieval, particularly during recollection.  When these results are 
compared to results from neuropsychology, an extra-mnemonic role for the parietal 
cortex, particularly one associated with the subjective experience of retrieved content, 
appears to be the most parsimonious explanation.  However, a subjective awareness 
account of parietal activity cannot adequately explain all of the findings from the 
literature, and most likely is only part of the story.  The parietal cortex is an extremely 
heterogeneous area, both in structural and functional connectivity.  The full story of 
the parietal cortex’s role in memory retrieval will most likely be explained with a 
variety of theories.  Increased levels of spatial segregation of the parietal cortex into 
distinct functional sub-regions will most likely reveal a myriad of functional roles that 
this region is playing during the complex cognitive process that is memory retrieval.
x	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Chapter 1:  Background and Introduction  
Recollection and Familiarity: 
     In a standard recognition memory test, subjects are presented with a set of stimuli 
and must decide whether or not they have encountered each stimulus before.  There 
are numerous techniques one can employ in order to accomplish this task, and in fact, 
a great deal of individual variability has been shown to exist (Kirchoff, 2009; 
Kirchoff & Buckner, 2006; Miller, Donovan, Van Horn, German, Sokol-Hessner, & 
Wolford, 2009).  Although there are a myriad of strategies one can utilize, the type of 
recognition generally falls under one of two categories (or both).  A subject can 
recognize the item using familiarity and/or use recollection to inform their memory 
decision.  Familiarity has been described as an undifferentiated, strength-like memory 
signal (Mandler, 1980).  This type of recognition is devoid of specific contextual 
information from the encoding event.  As a result, these memories are often weak in 
comparison to items recognized via recollection.  Recollection refers to memories that 
are often contextually rich and vivid, containing details about what was occurring 
during the encoding episode.  According to some, the defining feature of recollection 
is the experience of mentally traveling back in time to ‘re-experience’ the original 
event.  Tulving (2002) has argued in fact, that this ability to mental travel through 
time (which he refers to as autonoetic consciousness) is uniquely human.  This ability 
has been thought to rely on a deeper understanding of a sense of self, without which 
there would be no ‘traveler’.  Despite whether this ability to mentally travel through 
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time is uniquely human or not, there is a wealth of empirical evidence indicating that 
these two types of memory retrieval are distinct.   
     The idea that there are two unique modes of retrieval can be illustrated with a 
relatively common experience often referred to as the ‘butcher-on-the-bus’ 
phenomenon (Mandler, 1980).  The classic story is as follows:  imagine you are 
riding on a public bus and you see a fellow passenger whom you know that you have 
encountered previously.  This recognition is usually followed by a search process 
intending to answer the question, ‘Where do I know this man from?’.  You may ask 
yourself if you know him from work, from church, or from a variety of places you 
may often frequent.  If you’re lucky, the search may end with the insight, ‘That’s the 
butcher from the supermarket!’.  The initial sense of knowing that you’ve seen the 
man previously is context-free – that is, you cannot recall the environment in which 
this previous encounter has occurred.  This acontextual recognition is an example of 
familiarity-driven recognition.  The realization that the man works at the supermarket 
is supposed to illustrate recollection.  Most likely, when you come to this realization, 
you are able to envision a time that you had been at the supermarket and can in a 
sense ‘re-live’ an experience you may have had with this particular man.   
     Although the ‘butcher-on-the-bus’ phenomenon is one that is familiar to many of 
us, if the past has taught us anything, introspection can often lead scientists astray.  
This begs the question, what does the evidence reveal?  Surely if memories can be 
accurately described by one type of retrieval process instead of two then, according to 
Occam’s Razor, this should be the preferred explanation.  However, decades worth of 
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results from cognitive, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging studies of human 
memory strongly indicate that recognition memory performance reflects two distinct 
memory processes, i.e. familiarity and recollection.  
Behavioral Results 
     Behavioral studies investigating encoding manipulations provide evidence of the 
distinction between recollection and familiarity. For example, studies that have 
manipulated processing speed have shown that subjects are able to make accurate 
discriminations that can be based on familiarity relatively quickly, such as 
distinguishing between items that were recently studied and items that were not 
studied (item recognition).  In fact, in studies in which the speeded conditions 
required subjects to respond within approximately 1 second after the stimulus was 
presented, familiarity was not greatly affected by responses deadline.  On the contrary, 
discriminations that require subjects to use recollection to retrieve specific contextual 
information about the study event, such as what list or modality an item was 
presented in, tend to take significantly longer and are significantly disrupted when 
short response deadlines are imposed (Hintzman & Caulton, 1997; Gronlund, 
Edwards, & Ohrt, 1997; Hintzman, Caulton, & Levin, 1998).   
     A number of related studies have shown that as the time allowed to make a 
response is increased, the probability of incorrectly accepting a new item (i.e. making 
a false alarm) that is either similar to a studied item, or is from an inappropriate study 
list, first increases then decreases, producing biphasic accuracy/response-time 
functions (Dosher, 1984; Gronlund & Ratcliff, 1989; Hintzman & Curran, 1994; 
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Jacoby, 1999; McElree, Dolan, & Jacoby, 1999; Rotello & Heit, 2000). These results 
indicate that a fast familiarity process leads to false alarms to critical lures and only 
with additional retrieval time are subjects able to recollect the information that allows 
them to reject those items.  Collectively, it appears that a familiarity assessment can 
be completed relatively quickly, while recollection requires additional retrieval time.  
One exception to the finding that familiarity is faster than recollection comes from 
studies employing the remember/know paradigm, where know responses (which 
represent familiarity) are generally found to be slower than remember response 
(which represent recollection) (Dewhurst & Conway, 1994; Trott, Friedman, Ritter, & 
Fabiani, 1999).  However, these effects likely reflect the fact that the instructions in 
remember/know tests require subjects to respond ‘know’ only if the item is ‘familiar 
and not recollected.’  As a result, subjects are essentially instructed to wait until both 
processes are complete before making a ‘know’ response.  Therefore the fact that 
familiarity-driven responses are slow in this paradigm is not inconsistent with the idea 
that familiarity is generally a fast process.   
     Another encoding manipulation that differently affects familiarity and recollection 
has been highlighted by studies that manipulate the level of processing.  Deeper 
encoding, which usually involves processing the meaning of a stimulus (e.g. is the 
word abstract or concrete?) compared to shallow encoding, which usually involves 
processing the perceptual aspects of a stimulus (e.g. is the word in upper or lower 
case?) leads to an increase in recollection and a smaller but consistent increase in 
familiarity (Gardiner, 1988; Gardiner, Java & Richardson-Klavehn, 1996; Gardiner, 
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Ramponi, & Richardson-Klavehn, 1999; Gregg & Gardiner, 1994; Java, Gregg, & 
Gardiner, 1997; Khoe, Kroll, Yonelinas, Dobbins, & Knight, 2000; Komatsu, Graf, 
&Uttl, 1994; Perfect, Williams, & Anderton-Brown, 1995; Rajaram, 1993; Toth, 
1996; Wagner, Gabrieli, & Verfaellie, 1997; Wagner, Stebbins, Masciari, Fleischman, 
& Gabrieli, 1998; Yonelinas, 2001; Yonelinas, Kroll, Dobbins, Lazzara, & Knight, 
1998).  The same general result has been found depending on whether or not subjects 
are required to engage in deeper encoding by generating a word at the time of study 
(e.g. solving the anagram “ocuch” for the word “couch”), compared to simply reading 
the word.  Combined, these results suggest that both recollection and familiarity are 
sensitive to changes in levels of processing at study, but that recollection may be 
more sensitive to this influence than familiarity.  
     Another study manipulation that differently affects recollection and familiarity 
rates is the amount of attention devoted to the stimulus at the time of encoding.  
When subjects are required to complete a concurrent task during encoding (i.e. divide 
their attention), this tends to have larger negative effect on rates of subsequent 
recollection compared to subsequent familiarity, suggesting that encoding that leads 
to recollection is more attention-demanding than encoding that leads to familiarity 
(Craik, Govoni, Naveh-Benjamin, & Anderson, 1996).  Some research has even 
suggested that familiarity may not be reduced at all by dividing attention under 
certain conditions (Jacoby & Kelley, 1992).   
     Not only does dividing attention during encoding affect subsequent recollection 
rates, but there also seems to be a similar effect when subjects are forced to divide 
	   6	  
their attention at the time of retrieval.  Like that during encoding, this additional 
processing at the time of retrieval seems to disrupt recollection but does not appear to 
affect familiarity (Gruppuso, Lindsay, & Kelley, 1997; Dodson & Johnson, 1996).  
For example, in one experiment subjects were required to complete a memory test 
while simultaneously performing an auditory number-detection task.  This additional 
task effectively lowered recollection estimates while having no effect on estimates of 
familiarity (Gruppuso, Lindsay, & Kelley, 1997).  These results suggest that 
recollection is more cognitively demanding and thus is more sensitive than familiarity 
to the effects of dividing attention during the test phase.  
     Manipulations designed to increase the processing fluency of test items has been 
found to lead to an increase in familiarity-based responses (both for studied and non-
studied items), while leaving recollection-based responses relatively unaffected.  A 
myriad of manipulations have been used to increase processing fluency of test items 
including briefly flashing a word just prior to presenting it in a recognition test 
(Jacoby & Whitehouse, 1989), visually presenting a word more clearly than other 
words at test (Whittlesea, Jacoby, & Girad, 1990), and presenting a word in a 
conceptually related compared to an unrelated context.  These manipulations have 
been shown to increase processing fluency and specifically to increase familiarity 
rates while not effectively changing the rates of recollection.  On a related note, 
changing the perceptual characteristics of a word between study and test (e.g. 
changing the presentation modality between visual and auditory modalities) leads to a 
decrease in familiarity, but not in recollection (Gregg & Gardiner, 1994).   
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     Additionally, manipulations of response criterion (e.g. the amount of memory 
evidence required to make an ‘old’ response) during a recognition test seem to largely 
affect the probability that items will be accepted based on familiarity but tend to have 
little to no effect on recollection responses.  Specifically, relaxing the response 
criterion (i.e. requiring less evidence to make an ‘old’ response) generally leads to 
increases in the hit and false alarms rates of familiarity responses, whereas hit and 
false alarm rates of recollection remain relatively unchanged.  This pattern of results 
is seen when response criterion varies as a function of response confidence 
(Yonelinas,Dobbins, Szymanski, Dhaliwal, & King , 1996; Yonelinas, 2001), changes 
in the reported proportion of target items in the test list (Strack & Forster, 1995), and 
changes in the proportion of test items that subjects are required to accept as old 
(Strack & Forster, 1995). Although most studies have shown no effect of criterion on 
rates of recollection, there have been some challenges to this finding.  Specifically, 
some studies have reported small, but statistically significant changes in recollection 
rates (mostly driven by an increase in hit rates) when a laxed criterion is used to make 
memory decisions (Postma, 1999; Hirshman & Henzler, 1998).    
     Another illustration of the distinction between familiarity and recollection is 
accomplished by recording receiver operating characteristics (ROCs) data.  Typically 
this information is collected by requiring subjects to rate the confidence of their 
yes/no recognition decisions at the time of the recognition test.  Then one plots the hit 
rates against false alarm rates as a function of response confidence.  By examining the 
effect of varying response confidence on hit and false alarm rates, it is possible to 
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estimate the contribution of recollection and familiarity on recognition performance 
(Yonelinas, 1994).  The goal is to derive an equation that describes how hits and false 
alarms should be related if indeed performance reflects a combination of recollection 
and familiarity.  The equation is then fit to the observed empirical ROC in a manner 
similar to that used during linear regression.   However, in this case, the function is 
not linear and the two parameters that are estimated reflect familiarity and 
recollection rather than the slope and intercept respectively.  When this is done, the 
observed empirical functions are curvilinear and their shapes change across 
conditions, such that they require no less than two functionally independent memory 
parameters to describe them (Kelley & Wixted, 2001; Yonelinas, 1994, 1999; 
Yonelinas, et al., 1996).  This indicates that at least two separate memory components 
are needed to account for recognition performance. There is a general consensus in 
the field that familiarity is easily represented by signal detection measures, with 
familiarity strength varying along a continuum.  On the other hand, many in the field 
would argue that this is not the case with recollection, and that instead recollection is 
better represented as a threshold process where it either occurs in full or not at all 
(Yonelinas, 1999).  Although this threshold version of recollection is the more 
popular model, there have been some strong criticisms against this interpretation.  
Specifically, it has been argued that recollection, like familiarity, can also be 
described as varying along a memory strength continuum (albeit at the higher end of 
the continuum) and that in fact it can be experienced in a graded fashion.  Proponents 
of this idea argue that recollection simply reflects a stricter decision criterion used by 
	   9	  
the subject and that the apparent dual process results that come from ROC data can 
instead be explained by differences in unequal variances between old and new item 
distributions (Wixted & Stretch, 2004; Donaldson, 1996; Dunn, 2004).   
 
Results from Special Populations 
     In addition to experiments focused on normal, young, healthy subjects, numerous 
studies have been conducted focusing on special populations.  For example, several 
studies have investigated the effects of aging on familiarity-and-recollection-based 
retrieval.  Since older adults tend to be less impaired in tests of item recognition than 
for the recovery of source or contextual information (see Spencer & Raz, 1995 for a 
review), it is generally believed that age-related memory loss is primarily observed 
for recollection (Cabeza, Anderson, Locantore, & McIntosh, 2002; Davidson & 
Glisky, 2002; Duarte, Ranganath, Winward, Hayward, & Knight, 2004) while 
familiarity is generally spared (Daselaar et al., 2006; Howard, Bessette-Symons, 
Zhang, & Hoyer 2006; Jacoby, 1999; Jennings & Jacoby, 1993; Rybash & Hoyer, 
1996; Spencer & Raz, 1995; Titov & Knight, 1997; Yonelinas, 2001).  It has been 
suggested that a decline in the attentional resources allocated during encoding and 
retrieval, perhaps due to frontal lobe changes associated with normal aging, maybe 
responsible for the decrease in recollection in this group (Anderson, Craik, & Naveh-
Benjamin, 1998; Buckner, 2004; Park, Smith, Dudley, & Lafronza 1989; Salthouse, 
1994; Whiting & Smith, 1997).  Nonetheless, results from some studies suggest that, 
for some adults, both recollection and familiarity may be impaired (Davidson & 
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Glisky, 2002).  However most studies that have examined aging effects on memory 
have not considered intersubject variability, leaving open the possibility that different 
subgroups of elderly individuals might exhibit different patterns of memory changes.  
One study by Duarte and colleagues (Duarte, Ranganath, Truhillo, & Knight, 2006) 
separated elderly subjects into groups based on their overall memory performance.  
Those who were ‘high functioning’ older adults showed normal rates of familiarity 
but decreased recollection rates, while ‘low functioning’ older adults showed reduced 
rates of both types of retrieval.  These results suggest that the underlying processes 
related to recollection and familiarity are dependent upon individual memory 
performance and may be related to the degree of underlying neural dysfunction 
suffered by the individual.   
     Like healthy aging subjects, brain-damaged patients tend to show higher rates of 
impairment with recollection than with familiarity.  Specifically, damage that 
includes the hippocampus and surrounding temporal lobe areas have been found to 
disrupt both recollection and familiarity, but generally has a larger disruptive effect 
on recollection.  In contrast, relatively selective hippocampal damage appears to 
disrupt recollection, but not familiarity (Vann, Tsivillis, Denby, Quamme, Yonelinas, 
Aggleton, Montaldi, & Mayes, 2009). While impaired recollection seems to be the 
case in the majority of amnesia studies, the apparent non-effects on familiarity have 
been challenged.  Specifically, one study using the remember/know procedure 
showed that familiarity as well as recollection was severely disrupted (Knowlton & 
Squire, 1995), and another has provided evidence that familiarity was actually 
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enhanced in amnesia patients (Schacter, Verfaellie, & Pradere, 1996). However this 
discrepancy may be due to the somewhat messy nature of neuropsychology and the 
specific impairments that patients present may depend on how much of the medial 
temporal lobe outside of the hippocampus proper is damaged.  Beyond amnesia 
patients, a similar specific impairment on recollection has been reported for patients 
exhibiting the negative symptoms of schizophrenia (Thoma, Zoppelt, Wiebel, Daum, 
2006) as well as those suffering from Alzheimer’s disease (Tendolkar, Schoenfeld, 
Golz, Fernandez, Kuhl, Ferszt, Heinze, 1999). 
 
Neuroimaging Results 
     In addition to the numerous behavioral studies, neuroimaging studies also provide 
evidence for the distinction between recollection and familiarity.  Beginning in the 
early 1980s, numerous studies have reported that ERPs elicited in recognition 
memory tasks demonstrate old/new effects.  These effects take the form of more 
positive-going waveforms for recognized old items (hits) than for correctly rejected 
new items (correct rejections) (Johnson, 1995; Curran & Cleary, 2003; Vilberg, 
Moosavi, & Rugg, 2006).  These general ‘old/new’ effects seem to be dissociable into 
a familiarity and recollection signal.  A 300-500 ms familiarity-related effect, which 
has been called the FN400 old/new effect is frontally distributed.  A later 400-800 ms 
recollection-related ERP effect has been localized within the parietal lobe and has 
been aptly named the parietal old/new effect.  The evidence for relating the parietal 
old/new effect to recollection is particularly strong.  First, the parietal old/new effect 
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is associated with the recollection of specific information such as study modality and 
temporal source (Wilding & Rugg, 1996).  That is, the parietal old/new effect is 
primarily observed when such details are correctly recollected, but not when 
recognition occurs without such recollections.  Second, the parietal old/new effect is 
sensitive to the variables previously mentioned (e.g. depth of processing) that are 
thought to affect recollection more than familiarity.  Finally, when the 
remember/know paradigm is used to segregate items retrieved with recollection from 
those retrieved via familiarity, it is the recollected trials that are found to be 
associated with the parietal old/new effect (Smith, 1993).   
     More recent studies have begun to establish a correspondence between the FN400 
old/new effect and familiarity.  Several studies have tested recognition memory with 
semantically similar lures.  Assuming that the familiarity of studied and similar items 
is comparable, yet greater than for new items, the finding that the FN400 
differentiated new from studied/similar words (new>similar=studied) was consistent 
with the hypothesis that it reflects familiarity.  
    Although studies using ERPs are crucial in determining temporal differences in the 
neural signals underlying recollection and familiarity, the spatial resolution offered by 
this technique is less than optimal.  Luckily, studies using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI) have also investigated this issue.  Results from these 
studies show that across studies that vary widely in their designs, analysis methods, 
stimulus materials and test procedures, there is a consistent tendency for familiarity-
and recollection-related effects to be localized to different neural regions.  This effect 
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seems to be the most noticeable within the lateral parietal cortex.  Whereas 
familiarity-related effects are concentrated around the intraparietal sulcus (IPS) with a 
center of mass located in BA 7, recollection-related effects are more likely to be 
localized to the posterior part of the inferior parietal cortex, with a center of mass 
located within BA 39.  This dorsal/ventral distinction within the lateral parietal cortex 
will be discussed in more detail later.   
     The examples just described indicate that recognition tests that can be based on 
familiarity are functionally distinct and rely on partially separate neural substrates 
than those that require subjects to recollect information about the study event.  Such 
dissociations are expected if recognition performance relies on two distinct memory 
processes.  In contrast, if all recognition memory judgments were based on the 
assessment of a single form of memory, then these types of dissociations should not 
have been observed.   
 
Operationalizing Recollection and Familiarity: 
     Both recollection and familiarity can be used to guide memory decisions during a 
standard recognition memory test (Mandler, 1980). Therefore, in order to isolate the 
neural regions uniquely associated with recollection and familiarity, one must be able 
to differentiate which items were retrieved via recollection and which relied on 
familiarity.   
    By far, the two most common strategies for operationalizing recollection and 
familiarity during neuroimaging studies are the remember/know test and tests probing 
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source memory.  During a remember/know test, the subject is asked to identify what 
retrieval state (recollection or familiarity) was experienced on a trial-to-trial basis 
(Tulving, 1985).  When subjects believe they are using familiarity to make their 
recognition decision, they are asked to make a ‘know’ response, indicating that they 
know that they have seen the test item before.  However, when recollection occurs 
(i.e. when contextual information about the study episode is retrieved) subjects are 
asked to make a ‘remember’ response, indicating that recollection occurred.  Source 
tests take a much more objective approach, operationalizing the retrieval state 
according to whether or not recognition was accompanied by the recovery of a 
specific piece of contextual information (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993).  For 
instance, if words are the stimuli being used, the font color of the word may vary 
during the encoding phase.  At test, subjects may be required to recollect what font 
color the word was presented in.  Only if this specific piece of contextual information 
(i.e. font color) is correctly retrieved is recollection considered to have occurred.   
     Both methods have been heavily criticized in the literature.  First off, the 
remember/know test has shown to be very sensitive to variations in instructions 
(Geraci, McCabe, & Guillory, 2009).  Prior to testing, the experimenter must explain 
to the subject when it is appropriate to make a know response vs. a remember 
response.  The nuance between the two modes of retrieval can be difficult even for 
some memory researchers to grasp, let alone your every-day subjects that participate 
in a psychology experiment.  Unfortunately, changes in this instruction process only 
exacerbates this problem and leads to unconstrained differences between experiments.  
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Therefore, the remember/know test has been criticized for its subjective nature and 
exclusive reliance on the subject’s ability to correctly classify their retrieval state 
(Rotello, Macmillan, Reeder, & Wong, 2005; Donaldson, 1996; Dunn 2004; Dunn, 
2008; Wixted, 2007; Wais, Mickes, & Wixted, 2008).  On the other hand, the source 
test is criticized for being too restrictive on what qualifies as a recollected response 
(i.e. the ‘non-criterial problem’) (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1996).  Specifically, some 
have argued that recollection may in fact be occurring even if the specific contextual 
information chosen by the experimenter is not retrieved.  For example, a subject may 
be accurately retrieving visual imagery or associations created during the encoding 
phase even if the font color of the word is not also retrieved.  During a source 
memory test, this would not be considered recollection because the only contextual 
information that counts as recollection (in this example) is font color.   
    Despite these differences in procedural methodology, there seems to be a general 
assumption that these methods are essentially functionally equivalent, and as a result 
are often used interchangeably to separate familiarity and recollection.  Some 
researchers have gone so far as to claim that results from the remember/know and 
source tests are “neurally and functionally equivalent” (Rugg, Schloerscheidt, & 
Mark., 1998, p.47), and are “indistinguishable” (Mark & Rugg, 1998, p.861) from 
and “near identical to” (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995, p.637) each other.  This ostensible 
equivalence has been described both at the behavioral level (Yonelinas & Jacoby, 
1995) and at the neural level using evidence from event-related potentials (ERP) 
(Rugg, et al., 1998; Mark & Rugg, 1998).  In regards to the parietal lobe, both 
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methods have found recollection to be associated with the so-called ‘parietal old/new 
effect’ ERP component (Vilberg & Rugg, 2006; Curran, 2004; Wilding, 2000).  
Results from functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies have also shown 
a general convergence between these two approaches as to what brain regions within 
the left posterior parietal cortex (PPC) are sensitive to recollection and familiarity.  
Specifically, both methods have shown a dorsal/ventral dissociation within this area, 
with familiarity activating more dorsal regions centered around the intraparietal 
sulcus (IPS) and extending dorsally into the superior parietal lobule (SPL), and 
recollection activating more ventral regions within the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) 
(for reviews see: Ciaramelli, Grady, & Moscovitch, 2008; Hutchinson, Uncapher, & 
Wagner, 2009; Vilberg & Rugg, 2008; Wagner, Shannon, Kahn, & Buckner, 2005).  
This apparent convergence is informative because it suggests that the neural 
representations of familiarity and recollection are the same regardless of the 
methodology used to index them.   
Parietal Activity During Memory Retrieval: 
     It has long been known that episodic memory – the act of consciously encoding 
and retrieving information – depends on brain regions within the medial temporal 
lobe (MTL) and prefrontal cortex.  The MTL memory system comprises multiple 
structures, including the hippocampal formation and surrounding parahippocampal, 
perirhinal, and entorhinal cortices.  Decades worth of neuropsychological and 
neuroimaging studies of human MTL have indicated this region during the encoding, 
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consolidation, and retrieval of memories (Squire & Zola, 1991; Scoville & Milner, 
1957; Ranganath & Knight, 2003; Preston & Wagner, 2007; Squire & Zola, 1998).  
Prefrontal regions have been indicated during the encoding of information, as well as 
pre-and-post monitoring during retrieval of memories (Wagner, 2002; Ranganath, 
Johnson, D’Esposito 2003; Dobbins & Wagner, 2005; Kohler et al., 2004).  
      The advent of functional neuroimaging, first with PET and then with fMRI has 
led to a heightened appreciation of the extent of cortical involvement in long-term 
memory encoding and retrieval.  Among the regions identified most consistently in 
early studies of memory retrieval were medial and lateral posterior parietal cortex 
(Fletcher, Frith, & Rugg, 1997; Konishi, Wheeler, Donaldson, & Buckner 2000; 
Rugg, 1995). The blocked designs employed in early PET and fMRI studies present 
serious difficulties in the interpretation of retrieval-related neural activity.  These 
arise from the inability to characterize item-related activity according to the study 
history of the item or the response made by the subject.  With the development of 
event-related fMRI it became possible to directly contrast the activity elicited by 
different classes of recognition memory test item, and it soon became evident that 
both lateral and medial parietal cortex demonstrate ‘retrieval success’ effects (also 
referred to as ‘old/new’ effects).  The effects take the form of greater activity for 
recognized studied items than for correctly rejected new items (e.g. Henson, Rugg, 
Shallice, Josephs, & Dolan, 1999; Konishi, et al., 2000).  These ‘old/new’ effects 
have consistently been found to be lateralized to the left hemisphere, despite changes 
in stimuli (Guerin & Miller, 2009; for a review see Vilberg & Rugg, 2008; but see 
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Klostermann, Loui, & Shimamura, 2009).  Beyond simply identifying neural regions 
that demonstrate old/new effects, neuroimaging studies have suggested a range of 
distinct memory-related influences on parietal activation.  These include differences 
in activity based on recollection vs. familiarity, weak vs. strong memories, memories 
made with high vs. low confidence, the perception that the item is old, the frequency 
with which the target appears, and the expectancy of the subject (for a review see 
Ciaramelli, 2008).   Each of these influences will be discussed in the following 
subsection.   
Recollection vs. Familiarity 
     Vilberg and Rugg (2008) conducted a review of published event-related fMRI 
studies where contrasts were employed that allowed retrieval-related activity 
associated with recollection-and-familiarity-driven recognition judgments to be 
separately identified.  This was mostly done through the use of the ‘remember-know’ 
paradigm (Henson et al., 1999, Vilberg & Rugg, 2007, Wheeler & Buckner, 2004), 
source memory tests (Cansino et al., 2002, Kahn et al., 2004), or parametric tests 
involving confidence responses (Yonelinas, et al. 2005; Daeselaar et al., 2006).  Two 
studies (Henson, Hornberger, & Rugg 2005; Iidaka, Matsumoto, Nogawa, Tamamoto, 
& Sadato, 2006) were included where probability of recollection was modulated by a 
‘depth of processing’ manipulation during study (under the assumption that the 
benefit to recognition accruing from deep as opposed to shallow study is 
predominantly due to increased probability of recollection).   
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     Although the data collected varied widely in their designs, analysis methods, 
stimulus materials and test procedures, they found a consistent tendency for 
familiarity- and recollection-related effects to be localized to different regions of the 
left lateral posterior parietal cortex.  Whereas familiarity-related effects were 
concentrated in more dorsal/superior parietal regions (centered around the IPS), 
recollection-related effects were more localized to the ventral/inferior parietal regions 
(centered around the angular gyrus).  
Memory Strength/Confidence 
     Dorsal and ventral parietal regions have also been shown to dissociate based on 
the strength/confidence of the memory being retrieved (for a review, see Ciaramelli, 
2008).  Stronger, more confident memories tend to activate ventral regions of parietal 
cortex, whereas weaker, less confident memories have been shown to activate more 
dorsal regions.  For example, a recent fMRI study (Kim & Cabeza, 2007) compared 
brain activity for high-confidence vs. low-confidence “old” responses to studied 
words (hits).  The results yielded a clear dissociation between DPC and VPC regions:  
whereas DPC showed greater activity for low-than high-confidence hits, VPC showed 
greater activity for high- than low-confidence hits.   
     A study by Moritz and colleagues (2006) found similar results.  Items that 
received high vs. low confidence judgments, irrespective of accuracy, were 
characterized by higher activity in left inferior parietal lobule.  Unexpectedly, items 
that were recognized with low confidence showed increased activity in the right 
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superior parietal lobule.  Similar results were obtained by Fleck et al. (2006) who 
demonstrated that a region in the right superior parietal lobule signaled low 
confidence with memory decisions.   
     There have also been a number of studies where the investigator has manipulated 
the study conditions in order to indirectly test for memory strength/confidence at the 
time of retrieval.  For instance, Henson et al. (2005) manipulated depth of processing 
during the study session.  Words were pre-cued for either a semantic decision (‘deep 
processing’) or orthographic decision (‘shallow processing’).  At test, subjects were 
asked to distinguish the studied words form other words that were not studied.  Given 
the evidence that deeper semantic encoding increases the likelihood that the memory 
will be subsequently remembered, hits given to words that received deeper encoding 
were thought to reflect stronger memories than those that received the shallow task at 
the time of encoding.  Results of this manipulation showed that the stronger memories 
(those associated with the deep encoding task) activated left inferior parietal regions, 
whereas weaker memories (those afforded the shallow encoding task) activated more 
superior parietal regions centered around the intraparietal sulcus.   
Perception of Oldness 
     Although a lot of focus has been on activity that occurs during correct responses 
(i.e. hits and correct rejections), examining memory errors can provide important 
insight as to how this region is contributing to memory retrieval.  Two fMRI studies 
(at least that I am aware of) have addressed this important issue, measuring parietal 
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activation not only during accurate responses but also during memory errors (Wheeler 
& Buckner, 2003; Kahn et al., 2004).  Results showed that regions within the parietal 
lobe, in or around the inferior parietal cortex, were activated not only by hits but also 
by false alarms.  That is, this region was activated by the perception that the item was 
old, not by its actual mnemonic status.   
Retrieval Mode 
      A study by Dobbins et al. (2003) manipulated the retrieval mode a subject 
experienced on a trial-by-trial basis.  Subjects were either asked to report on the 
recency of the word or to attempt to retrieve its source at encoding.  Results showed 
that areas within the left lateral parietal cortex (particularly within the superior 
parietal subregions) were greater during attempts at source retrieval than recency 
retrieval, even when these attempts were unsuccessful (i.e. when an incorrect source 
attribution was made).  These results suggest that regions within the parietal cortex 
may have more to do with an attempt at retrieval rather than the actual output (i.e. 
memory representation) of the retrieval attempt.   
Target Frequency 
      The activity in the superior parietal cortex has been shown to be modulated by the 
frequency of targets during recognition memory tests (Vilberg & Rugg, 2009; Herron 
et al., 2004; Aminoff et al., 2014).   These experiments involved varying the relative 
probability of old and new test items and examining the effect on the neural correlates 
of recognition memory. When old items were relatively infrequent (25:75 ratio) 
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robust old/new effects were evident in left superior parietal regions.  These effects 
were absent however, and in some cases even showed a non-significant tendency to 
reverse direction, when the old/new ratio was reversed (Herron et al., 2004). The 
study by Aminoff and colleagues (2014) showed that activity within the superior 
parietal cortex was positively correlated with the subjects’ criterion value, indicating 
a relationship between response monitoring and parietal activity.  Furthermore, when 
subjects were divided into groups based on how much they shifted criterion between 
the low and high probability conditions, it was clear that the ‘old/new effect’ seen at 
the group level in the superior parietal regions was driven by the group that shifted 
criterion between conditions.  A study by Vilberg & Rugg (2009) investigated the 
effect probability manipulations would have specifically on familiarity-and-
recollection-driven responses using a source memory task to dissociate recollection 
from familiarity.  General retrieval success effects (regardless of source information) 
were found in superior parietal areas.  Specifically, a region in the anterior portion of 
the IPS and another region in the posterior superior parietal cortex were found to be 
modulated by changes in probability – with greater old/new effects exhibited in the 
low old (25%) probability condition.  Somewhat surprisingly and in contrast to 
previous results, the old/new effect within the middle portion of the IPS was not 
found to be modulated by the manipulation of probability.  Finally a region in ventral 
parietal cortex (specifically the angular gyrus) was found to be sensitive to 
recollection as operationalized by the source task and, like the middle IPS, was also 
not modulated by the probability condition.  Regardless of whether the targets were 
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infrequent or frequent, this ventral region showed maximal activity to hits compared 
to correct rejections.  The authors argued that these probability-insensitive regions 
were likely candidates for supporting processes directly related to memory retrieval 
and that the angular gyrus in particular may be recruited for recollection-related 
retrieval.   
Expectancy Violations 
     Only a few studies have investigated how subjects’ expectancies can modulate 
activity in the parietal cortex.  O’Connor et al. (2010) used a novel memory analog of 
attentional cueing in order to manipulate the correspondence between anticipated and 
actual recognition evidence by presenting valid or invalid anticipatory cues 
(e.g.,”likely old”) before recognition judgments.  Although a superior parietal region 
demonstrated the retrieval success pattern, a larger inferior parietal lobule region 
tracked the validity of the memory cueing (invalid cueing > valid cueing) and no 
retrieval success-sensitive lateral parietal region was insensitive to cueing.  Jaeger and 
colleagues (2013) used a similar cueing paradigm and found that the lateral parietal 
cortex could actually be segregated into three distinct areas depending on the effects 
the cueing manipulation had on differential activations.  An anterior angular region 
was found to exhibit an unexpected familiarity signal, showing greater activity for 
hits compared to correct rejections, but only when cued with the ‘likely new’ cue.  In 
contrast, a posterior angular region was found to be more activated for correct 
rejections compared to hits, but this was only evident when cued with the ‘likely old’ 
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cue.  A region in the middle of these two areas, located around middle IPS was found 
to be maximally activated by whatever stimulus was unexpected (i.e. a hit cued by the 
‘likely new’ condition or a correct rejection cued by the ‘likely old’ condition).  The 
authors interpreted this finding as this region displaying a memory orienting pattern – 
with differential activity depending on subjects’ expectations of the item history of 
the upcoming stimulus.  Importantly, the authors argued that this region is most likely 
not reflecting memory content per se, but instead re-directing attention towards an 
unexpected familiarity (anterior angular gyrus) or an unexpected novelty (posterior 
angular gyurs) signal.  Using a different memory paradigm, Ciaramelli and colleagues 
(2010) also found increased activity in posterior parietal cortex (particularly in ventral 
regions) when memory items were successfully retrieved after being invalidly cued.  
Instead of cueing subjects with ‘likely old’ or ‘likely new’, the authors used intact or 
recombined word pairs to modulate subjects’ expectations as to the item history of the 
upcoming stimulus.  Retrieval success effects were found to be maximal when 
subjects expected a new item to appear, but instead correctly recognized an old item 
(i.e. when their expectations contrasted with reality).  Additionally, patients with 
lesions in the ventral parietal cortex that participated in this study were found to have 
problems recognizing unexpected (invalidly cued) targets. The authors argued that 
their results showed evidence of the ventral parietal cortex playing a role in detecting 
relevant yet unexpected memory content.  They likened this process to the everyday 
experience of having a memory spontaneously pop into mind, and while doing so, 
interrupting pre-existing mental process (e.g. whatever the person was currently 
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thinking about).  For instance, using the classic butcher-on-the-bus story, this would 
be akin to unexpectedly coming across someone who is familiar on a bus.  Your 
bottom-up attention system acts to disrupt your current train of thought and instead 
focuses your attention towards this familiar man.   
Results from Neuropsychology 
     The striking consistency of parietal activation during memory retrieval has 
perplexed a lot of memory researchers.  This is mostly because lesions in this area do 
not typically yield severe episodic memory deficits, such as the ones associated with 
medial temporal lobe damage. Results from initial studies seemed to support this 
paradoxical relationship between neuroimaging data and neuropsychological data, 
with parietal lobe patients performing as well as controls on tests of source memory 
(Ally et al., 2008; Simons et al., 2008, 2010).  Simons and colleagues (2008) tested 
participants with unilateral parietal damage in areas that overlap with fMRI brain 
activations observed during source memory tasks.  At encoding, subjects were shown 
words or pictures and for each item had to decide whether the item was either 
pleasant/unpleasant or from entertainment/politics.  At test, subjects had to recall 
which judgment had been made for each stimulus.  The patients performed as well as 
controls on the source memory test.  Later, Simons et al. (2010) extended these 
findings to bilateral parietal patients.  In this study, subjects heard sentences presented 
in a male or female voice.  At test, they indicated whether the sentence was old or 
new, rated their confidence on the old/new decision, judged whether the original 
voice had been male or female and finally rated their confidence on their source 
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decision.  Although the bilateral parietal patients had normal source memory 
compared to controls, their confidence ratings for these decisions was significantly 
lower.  A follow-up experiment using visual stimuli found the same pattern of results, 
with normal source memory accuracy, but attenuated confidence associated with 
those decisions.  A study by Davidson et al. (2008) had parietal lobe patients encode 
words with definitions in a visual or auditory format and later asked them to retrieve 
the sensory domain at encoding and to make remember or know responses.  While the 
patients performed accurately when performing the source memory judgment, they 
made significantly fewer remember responses.  In three experiments performed by 
Berryhill and colleagues (2007), patients with bilateral parietal lobe lesions 
performed as well as matched healthy controls in recollecting the context in which 
previous events were experienced. Their source recollection ability held firm despite 
variations in task requirements across experiments.  These results provide evidence 
that recollection confidence declines after posterior parietal lobe damage, despite 
leaving the actual memory content unaffected.  Further evidence of reduced 
confidence in posterior parietal patients’ memories comes from a variety of 
paradigms (Hunkin et al., 1995; Ally et al., 2008; Davidson et al., 2008; Berryhill et 
al., 2009; Drowos et al., 2010; Simons et al., 2010; for a review see Berryhill, 2012).  
The dissociation between intact source recollection and reduced recollection 
confidence indicates that the bilateral patients retained the ability to recollect 
contextual information accurately, but that their experience of recollection may have 
been deficient in the rich episodic detail typical of healthy participants, resulting in 
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lower ratings of confidence (Lyle and Johnson 2006, 2007). Reduced subjective 
recollection is consistent with anecdotal observations by Davidson et al. (2008), also 
noted in other studies (Ally et al. 2008; Simons et al. 2008), of parietal patients 
reporting diminished confidence in their memory abilities when faced with an 
episodic recollection task, and remarking that their recollection of events lacks 
richness or vividness.  A role for the parietal lobe in supporting subjective aspects of 
recollection is also consistent with data from functional neuroimaging studies. 
Although parietal activity has been observed in studies that have used subjective 
recollection tasks, such as remember/know judgments (e.g., Henson et al. 1999), and 
more objective measures of recollection, such as source memory (e.g., Simons et al. 
2008), studies that have examined both subjective and objective memory within 
participants have indicated that parietal cortex may be particularly important for 
subjective memory. For example, Chua, Schacter, Rand-Giovannetti, & Sperling 
(2006) demonstrated that parietal activity was greater when participants made 
subjective memory confidence assessments than when they made objective 
recognition memory decisions. Moreover, Duarte et al. (2008) linked parietal cortex 
activity to subjective ‘‘remember’’ responses but not objective source judgments in 
young and high functioning older adults, and showed that this parietal activity was 
significantly reduced in low-functioning older adults who were impaired at the 
subjective remember/know task. Similarly, Drowos and colleagues (2010) recently 
found that patients with bilateral parietal damage express an unusually low number of 
remember responses, but a normal number of know responses, on a false memory 
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task. Interesting, patient S.M. reported by Davidson and colleagues (2008) reported 
that she could recall events of her life but that her memories did not seem to be 
accompanied by a sense of having experienced the event herself.  Thus, patients with 
parietal lesions appear to have deficits in the assessment and monitoring processes 
that contribute to subjective aspects of recollection, resulting in low confidence, 
diminished detail in spontaneous autobiographical narratives and in reported 
mnemonic vividness and richness (Berryhill et al. 2007; Davidson et al. 2008; Simons 
et al. 2008), as well as reduced ‘‘remember’’ responses (Davidson et al. 2008; 
Drowos et al. 2009). The subjective memory processes described above may 
contribute towards objective measures of recollection such as source memory, as 
evidenced by parietal activity during source memory in healthy volunteers (e.g., 
Simons et al. 2008), but they appear in many instances not to be necessary for 
accurate objective recollection to occur, as demonstrated by the intact source 
recollection observed in the present study and in previous reports (Davidson et al. 
2008; Simons et al. 2008).  
Theories of Parietal Activity During Memory Retrieval: 
     There is no shortage of theories meant to explain parietal activity observed during 
memory retrieval.  I will discuss the four most popular explanations in the following 
section: 1.  the dual attentional processes hypothesis, 2. the episodic output buffer 
hypothesis, 3. the mnemonic accumulator hypothesis, and 4.  the subjective 
experience hypothesis.  In order to determine exactly how these parietal regions may 
be contributing to memory processes, many researchers first turned to the more 
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classical cognitive functions that are usually associated with parietal cortex activity.  
The one that has gained the most support is the role that this region plays in attention.  
However, before the role of attention in memory can be addressed, its well-known 
role in perception must first be explained.   
     According to Corbetta and Shulman (2002), the human attentional system is 
comprised of two partially segregated networks of brain areas that carry out different 
attentional functions.  One system, which includes dorsal regions of the parietal 
cortex and superior regions within the frontal cortex, is involved in preparing and 
applying goal-directed (top-down) selection for stimuli and responses. People are 
better at detecting an object in a visual scene when they know in advance something 
about its features, such as its location, motion, or color.  This facilitation depends on 
the ability to represent this advanced information, and to use it to bias the processing 
of incoming visual information. Corbetta and Shulman (2002) reviewed evidence of 
this top-down allocation of attention and found it to be associated with activity within 
the dorsal parietal cortex – particularly in the superior parietal lobule (SPL) and 
around the intraparietal sulcus (IPS).  In a simple detection study, Corbetta et al. 
(2000) presented a cue in the form of an arrow indicating the most likely location of a 
subsequent visual target.  They found these regions to be maximally active during the 
cue period, i.e. when attention was oriented toward a relevant location.  Furthermore, 
when the delay after the cue offset was extended, forcing subjects to maintain 
attention at the cued location for longer, these regions were the only ones that showed 
a sustained response.  Activation in these dorsal parietal regions is not apparently 
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restricted to shifts in visuo-spatial attention alone.  This region has been activated by 
shifts between two different features of an object (Liu, Slotnick, Serences, & Yantis, 
2003) and shifts between two different sensory modalities (Shomstein & Yantis, 
2003).  Additionally, recent fMRI studies have shown these regions to be activated by 
voluntary orienting to nonperceptual properties of the stimuli, such as their semantic 
category (Cristescu, Devlin, & Nobre, 2006).  
     The other attentional system, which includes more ventral regions of parietal 
cortex and inferior regions within the frontal cortex, is specialized for the detection of 
behaviorally relevant stimuli, particularly when they are salient or unexpected.  This 
ventral frontoparietal networks works as a ‘circuit breaker’ for the dorsal system, 
directing attention to the salient events.  A number of fMRI studies have documented 
that regions in the ventral parietal cortex including the temporo-parietal junction 
(TPJ), supramarginal gyrus, and angular gyrus are activated by the bottom-up 
attentional capture by stimuli that are potentially important for the individual.  In the 
experiment by Corbetta et al. (2000) mentioned above, activity in the ventral parietal 
cortex (centered around the right TPJ) was specifically engaged during the detection 
of the target, whereas it showed little if any response to the orienting cue.  When the 
targets occurred at an unexpected location, the activity in this region was further 
enhanced.  The authors concluded that activation of this region may mediate 
automatic attention toward relevant, yet unattended, stimuli.  Additionally, this region 
is selectively activated when subjects are presented with infrequent targets, such as 
auditory or visual oddball stimuli.   
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     Patients with lesions in the right ventral parietal cortex often show signs of 
unilateral neglect, a deficit in detecting contralesional stimuli across diverse sensory 
modalities.   Consistent with the idea that these regions mediate bottom-up attention, 
these patients often have a deficit in detecting stimuli that are unattended and outside 
the focus of processing but they can voluntarily direct attention to the contralesional 
side (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002).   
     Corbetta and Shulman (2002) do not describe the difference between the 
attentional functions of the dorsal and ventral parietal cortices as a sharp dichotomy 
but as a more graded difference.  First, they note that the dorsal parietal cortex (DPC) 
shows some sensitivity to the presentation of infrequent events, which suggest it is 
also affected by bottom-up attentional processes.  Second, although ventral parietal 
cortex (VPC) activity is driven by incoming information, activity in this region is also 
modulated by task relevancy.  For instance, this region will show greater activity to 
salient, infrequent stimuli in the modality being attended, but not in a different 
modality.  Also, an fMRI study found that during search for a red target, right VPC 
was activated by red distractors, which apparently captured attention bottom-up, but 
not by distractors in other salient colors, which did not capture attention (Serences et 
al., 2005; for a review see Corbetta, Patel, & Shulman, 2008).  Thus, in order to 
activate the VPC, it is not enough that a stimulus is salient; it must also be relevant to 
the goals of the current task (which are maintained by the DPC). Conversely, the 
detection of unexpected events in VPC can enhance or attenuate sustained goal-
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driven processes in DPC. It is in this kind of fluid dynamic that ventral and dorsal 
parietal regions interact with and influence each other. 
The Dual Attentional Process Hypothesis 
     As discussed above, research in the attentional domain has shown that dorsal 
parietal regions are implicated in the voluntary orienting of attention to relevant 
aspects of the environment, whereas ventral parietal regions mediate the automatic 
allocation of attention to task-relevant information (Corbeta & Shulman, 2002).  
According to the Dual Attentional Processes (DAP) hypothesis, the dorsal and ventral 
regions of the parietal lobe play conceptually similar roles in episodic memory 
retrieval (Cabeza, Ciaramelli, Olson, & Moscovitch, 2008; Ciaramelli, et al., 2008; 
Ciaramelli, et al., 2010).  It is proposed that the dorsal parietal cortex is associated 
with the allocation of attentional resources to memory retrieval according to the 
strategic goals of the rememberer (top-down attention), particularly engaged when 
sought-after memories are difficult/effortful to retrieve.  On the other hand, the 
ventral parietal cortex is believed to be associated with the capture of attentional 
resources by relevant memory cues and/or recovered memories (bottom-up attention).  
This region is maximally active when strong memories spontaneously ‘pop’ into a 
subject’s memory and internal attention is redirected towards this surprised recovery 
of mnemonic information.  Just as in the attention model provided by Corbetta & 
Shulman (2002), these dorsal and ventral regions of parietal cortex should not be 
thought of as a strict dichotomy, but rather as an interacting system.  Some evidence 
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for this theory comes from the patient literature.  Specifically, Berryhill and 
colleagues (2007) showed that patients with ventral parietal damage (ostensibly 
affecting their bottom-up attention system) were unable to freely recall 
autobiographical memories.  These same patients however, were able to answer 
specific questions about their memories when probed.  The authors argued that the 
patients’ intact dorsal parietal cortex (ostensibly reflecting top-down attention) 
allowed them to access these memories even though an impaired bottom-up attention 
system failed to retrieve them automatically.  They likened this impairment to visual 
neglect patients who have difficulty freely attending to certain areas in space although 
these same patients are able to do so when provided with the proper visual cues. 
Similar evidence comes from a study performed by Ciaramelli and colleagues (2010) 
who directly manipulated top-down and bottom-up attention in an fMRI experiment 
with controls and parietal lobe patients.  Results showed that control subjects engaged 
the left dorsal parietal cortex when provided with memory cues and the ventral 
parietal regions were maximally engaged when items were invalidly cued.  Although 
valid cueing offered control subjects a behavioral advantage, dorsal parietal cortex 
patients did not benefit from this additional information (which most likely involves 
top-down attention).  On the other hand, ventral parietal patients had difficulty 
recognizing invalidly cued memory items, suggesting that these patients had deficits 
recognizing unexpected mnemonic information (i.e. when the bottom-up attention 
network is likely engaged).     
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Episodic Output Buffer Hypothesis 
      The episodic output buffer hypothesis suggests that this region actually represents 
or holds retrieved information in a form accessible to decision-making processes, 
analogous to Baddeley’s proposed working memory buffer (Baddely, 1998). 
Although long-term memories are not stored in neuronal firing patterns, in order to 
influence decision-making, such memories must be expressed in active neuronal 
response patterns.  The lateral parietal cortex could act as the buffer into which stored 
information is transferred.  Specifically, the lateral parietal cortex could be an 
episodic memory output buffer that temporarily stores recovered long-term 
representations in a form rapidly accessible to decision making. Under this 
framework, raw memory representations are assumed inaccessible or too distributed 
for decision making systems to act upon and instead require an intermediate term 
store or buffer for conscious access during choice or reasoning (Baddeley, 2000). 
Thus the lateral parietal cortex would act as a temporary buffer similar to those 
proposed to operate in verbal or visual working memory in order to make retrieved 
episodic memory contents rapidly available for ongoing reasoning or executive 
operations.  Some evidence that supports this theory comes from a study conducted 
by Vilberg and Rugg (2007) where they manipulated the amount of information 
recollected at the time of retrieval.  Their results showed that the more information 
that was successfully recollected, the more active the parietal cortex (specifically the 
ventral portion) became.   
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Mnemonic Accumulator Hypothesis 
     According to this hypothesis, regions in posterior parietal cortex would play a role 
in accumulating, or temporally integrating, neural signals related to the target and 
store information about it until a criterion is reached that leads to the memory 
decision required by the task at hand.  In other words, parietal activity reflects the 
accumulation of an “oldness” signal until a response is finally made. The portions of 
lateral parietal cortex connected to the MTL, for example, could integrate its retrieval 
activity over time, triggering a judgment of recognition when information levels 
reached a decision bound.  Such a function is conceptually similar to other proposed 
forms of information accumulation in posterior parietal cortex neurons. The strongest 
support for this theory comes studies that have shown that parietal regions become 
active even when new items are falsely recognized as old (Wheeler & Buckner, 2003; 
Kahn et al., 2004).  This is in line with an accumulator explanation because an 
oldness signal would lead to an ‘old’ response regardless of the accuracy of the 
decision.  Additionally, some parietal regions have been shown to modulate activity 
in a linear fashion, with the least activity to correct rejections, slightly more for 
misses, greater activity for false alarms, and the most activity to hits (Wheeler & 
Buckner, 2003).  This linear modulation is in line with an accumulator model of 
parietal activity.   
 
Subjective Experience Hypothesis 
     This view puts forth the idea that the lateral parietal cortex signals the experience 
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of retrieving a remembered event. In essence, this distinguishes between something 
vividly retrieved versus something vaguely recalled. Proponents suggest that damage 
to this processing explains findings of reduced confidence in parietal patients’ 
memories across various paradigms (Hunkin et al., 1995; Ally et al., 2008; Davidson 
et al., 2008; Berryhill et al., 2009; Drowos et al., 2010; Simons et al., 2010). This 
theory also involves processing personal ownership of retrieved memories.  When 
recollected memories are re-experienced, they are done so through the eyes of an 
‘experiencer’.  According to Endel Tulving (2002), this sense of self is critical to 
episodic memories.  Without this self, there is no time traveler to go back in time to 
re-live the original event (i.e. autonoetic consciousness).  When a specific personal 
event is retrieved from memory, it is not just factual information that is retrieved, but 
instead it is an entire experience that the person remembering is reliving.  According 
to this theory, it is this part of the brain that creates this egocentric point of view, a 
sense of personal ownership, that is associated with recollected memories.  This may 
explain why Davidson’s patient S.M. who had bilateral parietal damage was able to 
accurately describe memories from her past but described them as not belonging to 
her (Davidson et al., 2008).  
 
Multiple Explanations 
     It is important to note that none of these theories are mutually exclusive. 
Especially given the large expanse of cortical space the lateral parietal cortex 
encompasses and its exceptional extent of structural and functional heterogeneity, it is 
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quite possible that several or even all of these theories may be correct.  For example, 
a recent view has been to create a hybrid of two existing proposals: the subjective 
experience and dual attention hypothesis (Berryhill et al., 2009; Drowos et al., 2010). 
The advantage for this merger is that it includes a role for the lateral parietal cortex in 
strategically accessing and attending to the full set of details associated with a 
particular event. It also includes the function of assessing the vivid richness of 
memories to account for the deficits in memory confidence. In other words, when the 
lateral parietal cortex is damaged, patients may not be able to fully reactivate the full 
assembly of stored details to revivify the event. This would lead to impoverished 
recollections and a reduced sense of re-experiencing a past event.  Furthermore, it is 
also very much possible that both the dual attentional processes hypothesis and 
episodic output buffer hypothesis are valid descriptions of parietal involvement in 
memory retrieval.  It just may be that different subregions of this heterogeneous 
region are responsible for various functions that all must occur simultaneously for 
accurate memory retrieval to happen.   
 
Overview of Experiments 
     This dissertation will report two experiments that aim to test whether parietal 
activations will be modulated by changes in task demands.  Specifically, experiment 1 
will compare the two main methodologies for segregating familiarity and recollection 
(i.e. the remember/know paradigm and a source memory test).  Experiment 2 will 
manipulate the base rates of old and new items presented at test using the 
	   38	  
remember/know paradigm.  These task demands should affect extra-mnemonic 
processes that guide memory decisions, but should not be associated with changes in 
the amount of memory content retrieved.  Any parietal differences observed based on 
these procedural manipulations would be difficult for an episodic buffer theory to 
explain.  Instead, such modulations would be in agreement with theories that suggest 
an extra-mnemonic role for the parietal cortex during memory retrieval, such as 
changes in attentional demands or changes in the subjective experience associated 
with retrieved memory content.   
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Chapter 2:  Experiment 1. The Posterior Parietal Cortex:  Comparing 
remember/know and source memory tests of recollection and familiarity 
 
Introduction      
     As previously described, there is a general agreement across neuroimaging studies 
indicating more dorsal/superior lateral parietal regions in familiarity-driven 
recognition, with more ventral/inferior regions associated with recollection (for a 
review see Vilberg & Rugg, 2008).  This general dissociation has been found 
regardless of whether a  remember/know test or a source memory test is used to 
separate responses according to familiarity and recollection.  While this convergence 
is somewhat reassuring, the fMRI literature is lacking a direct and adequate 
comparison of the neural correlates of recollection and familiarity between these two 
methods. Without this, there remains a possibility that this apparent convergence is 
merely an illusory finding.  If results of such a comparison concluded that different 
lateral parietal regions were active depending on the test used, this would suggest that 
these two methods are not as equivalent at measuring recollection and familiarity as is 
currently assumed.  In particular, it would suggest that these divergent brain regions 
may be representing either a difference in retrieved memory content or a difference in 
the cognitive demands associated with retrieval depending on what method was used 
to operationalize recollection and familiarity.  Specifically, it could be the case that 
recollected memories from the source task may be more constrained than memories 
retrieved via the remember/know task.  Additionally, it may be relatively effortful to 
search for the specific contextual information required by the source test.   This 
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increased search effort may engage the top-down attentional system to a greater 
degree than during the remember/know test. Regardless of what theory is used to 
explain any differences that might be found, this result would be informative to the 
field since the standard view is to treat remember/know and source memory tests as 
equivalent measures of recollection and familiarity.    
     While some fMRI comparisons have been made between the two methods, the 
vast majority have been conducted between experiments (Ciaramelli et al., 2008; 
Hutchinson et al., 2009; Vilberg & Rugg, 2008; Wagner et al., 2005).  Thus, 
comparisons have been made across a wide range of stimuli, variations in 
experimental design, differences in analysis technique, and perhaps most 
detrimentally, between different subjects. Without controlling for these confounding 
variables, neural differences between remember/know and source memory tests may 
be difficult, if not impossible to detect.  In other words, even if specific sub-regions of 
the parietal cortex were more sensitive to one test than the other, co-varying 
differences in experimental designs may attenuate or even completely mask this 
effect.  Take for instance, the type of stimulus used during testing.  Variations in the 
specific location of neural activity have been found within the left ventral parietal 
depending on the stimulus type that was used to invoke the activity (Elman & 
Shimamura, 2013; Klosterman, et al., 2009).  Research investigating individual 
differences during recognition memory tests has shown extensive yet reliable 
differences in brain activity patterns between individuals (Miller, Van Horn, Wolford, 
Hnady, Valsangkar-Smyth, Inati, Grafton, & Gazzaniga, 2002; Miller, et al., 2009).  
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If variables such as these are free to vary during comparisons of the remember/know 
and source memory tests, one could imagine how any true differences in neural 
activity between the two methods may go undetected.    
     Although most fMRI comparisons have been conducted with this between-
experiment approach, there have been a few comparisons utilizing a within-subjects 
design (Duarte, et al., 2008; Vilberg & Rugg, 2007; Yu, Johnson, & Rugg, 2012).  
The goal of these studies, however, was not to directly compare the two 
methodologies, but instead to focus on how the amount of recollected information 
modulates activity within the lateral parietal cortex.  While successful in tackling 
their specific goal, the designs of these studies were not optimal for a direct 
comparison between remember/know and source tests. First of all, none of these 
studies directly compared the neural correlates of familiarity between these two 
methods.  Instead, they focused exclusively on recollection-related comparisons.  
While lately much focus has been made to elucidate the neural correlates of 
recollection, familiarity-related activity is still far from understood.  Therefore, when 
comparing parietal activations between remember/know and source tests, it is just as 
important to investigate familiarity-related activity as it is activity related to 
recollection.  Furthermore, none of these studies used the traditional testing 
methodologies, but instead used variants of the remember/know paradigm to find 
brain regions that were active during the remember/know task and were additionally 
modulated by the source task.  Therefore, when identifying regions that were 
sensitive to source recollection, analysis was constrained to regions that were 
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additionally active during recollection in the remember/know task.  As a result, no 
independent measure of objective recollection was/could be reported.  Although 
helpful in highlighting brain regions that are modulated by the amount of information 
recollected (Vilberg & Rugg, 2007; Yu et al., 2012), without an independent measure 
of source recollection they cannot speak to the apparent convergence between 
remember/know and source memory tests.   
    In an effort to avoid the limitations of between-subject designs, the same group of 
subjects will participate in both a remember/know test and a source memory test.  
Additionally, the same stimuli (words), scanner protocol, and analysis parameters will 
be used for both tests. To obtain independent measures of subjective and objective 
recollection and familiarity, the remember/know test and source test will be taken 
independent of each other (as opposed to a combined procedure where subjects make 
a remember/know and/or a source judgment on each trial).  The results from these 
two tests will be directly compared so that potential differences in neural activation 
may be found, with specific focus on activation within the left lateral parietal cortex. 
    The results of this direct comparison may reveal something important about the 
assumed equivalence of the remember/know and source memory tests at indexing 
recollection and familiarity.  If neural differences are found between testing methods, 
then the generally-held assumption that these methods are tapping into functionally 
equivalent memory processes would need to be readdressed. Additionally, attempts to 
attribute any particular functional role to parietal activity during memory retrieval 
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would need to take these differences into account which would be particularly 
problematic for the episodic buffer theory.   
Methods 
 Subjects 
     Twenty-five healthy subjects (7 female) took part in this study. Subjects ranged in 
age from 19 – 35 years old (M = 24.8, SD = 4.6). Data from eight additional subjects 
were not included in any reported analyses (one due to a failure to complete the 
experiment in its entirety, two due to an insufficient number of trials of interest <20, 
and five for excessive movement). All subjects were native English speakers and all 
except one reported their right hand to be dominant.  All subjects gave informed 
consent as approved by the UCSB Institutional Review Board and were paid for their 
participation.  
Stimuli 
     Stimuli consisted of 608 nouns selected using the MRC Psycholinguistic Database 
(www.psy.uwa.edu.au/mrcdatabase/uwa_mrc.htm).  For counterbalancing purposes, 
words were pseudorandomly divided into two lists of 304 words each.  These lists 
were matched (as closely as possible) on ratings of concreteness, familiarity, 
imagability, Kucera Francis written frequency, number of letters and number of 
syllables. Words were back projected onto a screen at the head of the scanner bore 
and were visible to the subject by a mirror mounted on the head coil.  Words were 
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presented in the center of the screen in black 85-point Times New Roman font against 
a white background.  Stimulus presentation was controlled by a MacBook Pro laptop 
running Matlab R2008a version 7.6.0 (The Mathworks Inc., USA), using the 
Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner, Brainard, & Pelli, 2007; 
Pelli, 1997).   
Procedure 
     Before entering the scanner, subjects engaged in a short practice session that 
mimicked what they would experience in the scanner. During this practice session, 
subjects took a source memory test and a remember/know test. Just prior to the 
remember/know test, subjects were given explicit instructions and examples of when 
to make a ‘remember’ and a ‘know’ response.  These instructions were modified 
versions from those previously used in the literature (Rajaram, 1993) (see Appendix 
for a copy of the test instructions). In an attempt to ensure that these instructions were 
understood, after completing the practice remember/know test, subjects were asked 
what specific details were recalled for the items that were given ‘remember’ 
responses.  Subjects were not allowed to continue with the procedure until the 
experimenter was convinced that a proper understanding of when to make a 
‘remember’ vs. a ‘know’ response was achieved.  
      Once in the scanner, the task consisted of four study runs and four test runs.  
Subjects underwent all four study runs followed shortly by four test runs. During each 
study run, 76 words were presented one at a time on the screen for 2.5 seconds 
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followed by a blank screen for .7 seconds.  During two of the study runs, subjects 
were asked to make a ‘Pleasant/Unpleasant’ decision about each word, for the other 
study runs subjects made an ‘Abstract/Concrete’ decision about each word. Subjects 
alternated between ‘Pleasant/Unpleasant’ and ‘Abstract/Concrete’ runs, with the 
order pseudo-randomized between subjects. After the fourth study run, an anatomical 
scan (approximately 9 minutes long) was collected, during which the subject was 
allowed to rest.  Following this, the subjects began the first of four test runs. Each test 
run consisted of 152 words (76 old, 76 new), for a total of 608 test words. Each word 
was displayed on the screen for 2.7 seconds followed by a blank screen for .5 seconds.  
For two test runs, memory was tested using a source memory paradigm.  Subjects 
indicated whether each word had been studied during one of the ‘Pleasant/Unpleasant’ 
study runs, during one of the ‘Abstract/Concrete’ study runs, whether the item was 
recognized as being part of the study session but the subject did not recall which run 
the word was presented in (‘Don’t Know’ response), or whether the word was new.  
For the remaining test runs, subjects engaged in a remember/know paradigm, where 
subjects made a ‘remember’ response when recollection occurred, a ‘know’ response 
when familiarity was used to make their decision, or a ‘new’ response. Subjects 
alternated between ‘Remember/Know’ and ‘Source Memory’ runs, with the order 
pseudo-randomized between subjects. To minimize fatigue, subjects were given a 
one-minute break in the middle of each 12-minute test scan. During both the study 
runs and the test runs, a response scale appeared on the screen below the word to help 
subjects remember which button mapped onto which response option. 
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     Assignment of words to test paradigm and to old/new status was pseudo-
randomized between subjects.  All responses were made using an MRI-compatible 
button box held in their right hand. To enable event-related analysis, 41 fixation trials 
were added to each study run and 79 fixation trials were added to each test run. The 
order of stimulus events during study and test runs was pre-determined by a genetic 
algorithm that optimized the design efficiency for the old/new contrast (Wager and 
Nichols, 2003).  
     Although one could argue that a more effective way to compare the two testing 
methods would be to integrate remember/know and source decisions within the same 
run instead of segregating into different runs, we had a specific rationale for avoiding 
this methodology.  Basically, we wanted to replicate how these testing procedures are 
most commonly used.  If we were to introduce a requirement to switch between 
making remember/know decisions and source decisions on a trial-to-trial basis, then 
this may involve additional processing that is not normally required during these 
recognition tests.  Particularly since the dorsal parietal area has been shown to be 
involved with top-down attention (Corbetta & Shulman, 2002), requiring this 
additional processing of task-switching may modulate the PPC activity, not because 
of differences between the two tasks, but instead because of this additional procedural 
step.  Therefore, we decided to segregate remember/know and source tests into 
different runs.   
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MRI Data Acquisition 
     A 3T Siemens TIM Trio scanner with a standard 12-channel head coil located at 
the UCSB Brain Imaging Center was used to scan all subjects. Earplugs were 
provided to minimize noise disturbance and cushions were placed around the subjects’ 
head to minimize movement.  A high-resolution anatomical image was collected for 
each subject using a magnetization-prepared rapid acquisition gradient-echo sequence 
(MPRAGE) with TR = 2.3s, TE = 2.98ms, and FA = 9°.  Each volume was collected 
with 3-D acquisition and consisted of 160 sagittal slices that were each 1.1 mm thick 
with 1 mm x 1 mm in-plane resolution.  The eight functional runs consisted of a T2*-
weighted single shot gradient-echo, echo planar image (EPI) sequence sensitive to the 
BOLD contrast with TR = 1.6s, TE = 30ms, and FA = 90°. Volumes were acquired 
parallel to the AC-PC plane in an interleaved pattern using generalized 
autocalibrating partially parallel acquisitions (GRAPPA). Each volume consisted of 
30 slices that were each 3mm thick with a .5 mm gap and a 3 mm x 3 mm in-plane 
resolution. The first four volumes of each functional scan were discarded to allow 
equilibration of tissue magnetization.  Although functional images were collected 
during the study sessions, these results are beyond the scope of this paper and are not 
discussed further.   
Preprocessing of MRI Data 
     SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience) was used to perform 
standard spatial preprocessing of the MRI data.  All functional images were realigned 
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to the first volume of the first functional scan using a least squares approach and a 6 
parameter (rigid body) spatial transformation.  During realignment, images were 
unwarped in order to minimize variance caused by the susceptibility-by-movement 
interaction (Andersson, Hutton, Ashburner, Turner, & Friston, 2001). The functional 
images were then coregistered to the anatomical image using the mean functional 
image generated during realignment.  Next, using standard segmentation procedures, 
the anatomical T1 image was segmented into images of grey matter, white matter, 
and cerebral spinal fluid.   These images were then spatially normalized to the ICBM 
Tissue Probabilistic Atlases that come standard in SPM8.  The parameters of this 
transformation were then applied to the functional images, which were re-sampled to 
3 mm isotropic voxels.  Finally, the normalized images were spatially smoothed using 
an isotropic Gaussian kernel with an FWHM = 8 mm.  
Analysis of Functional Data 
     SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience) was used for further data 
analysis. Neural activity at stimulus onset was modeled using a delta (stick) function 
that was convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). To 
account for differences in response time (see Results), reaction time was entered into 
the model as a parametric modulator of the HRF using a first-order linear transform 
of the delta function.  Data across the four functional runs was concatenated, and 
session-specific regressors were added into the model.  Eleven event-types were 
modeled in total.  Five for the remember/know test: correct rejections, remember hits, 
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know hits, false alarms, and misses and five for the source test: correct rejections, 
source hits, no source hits, false alarms and misses.  ‘Source hits’ refers to trials in 
which the item was correctly recognized and was given the correct source attribution.  
‘No source hits’ refers to trials in which the item was correctly recognized but was 
either given the wrong source attribution or received a ‘Don’t Know’ response.  There 
was an additional event-type of no interest, which was comprised of trials with 
omitted or multiple responses and trials when instructional information was presented 
on the screen.  The data was high-pass filtered at 128s and an AR(1) model was used 
to estimate and correct for non-sphericity of the error covariance (Friston, Glaser, 
Henson, Kiebel, Phillips, & Ashburner, 2002).  The general linear model (GLM) was 
used to obtain parameter estimates of events of interest and subsequent contrast t-
maps were created for each subject.  These contrast maps were then passed on to a 
second-level random-effects analysis that consisted of testing the contrast against zero 
using a one-sample t- test independently at each voxel across the brain.  
Regions of Interest (ROI) Analysis 
     Marsbar (Brett, Anton, Valabreque, & Poline, 2002) was used to create and 
analyze BOLD activation from a priori chosen regions of interest (ROIs). Structural 
ROIs were determined according to the AAL atlas that is included with the Marsbar 
software package. These regions were the left superior parietal lobule (BA 7) and the 
left angular gyrus (BA 39).  For these ROIs, the mean percent signal change from 
baseline within that region was calculated for each event type.  Values representing 
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recollection and familiarity (as defined by each test) were then calculated for each 
subject by subtracting the percent signal change from the appropriate events (e.g. 
subtracting the percent signal change to know hits from the percent signal change to 
remember hits for remember/know recollection).  These values were then averaged 
across subjects to obtain a mean percent signal change value for each contrast of 
interest.     
Results 
Behavioral results 
     We calculated overall d’ (memory accuracy) and c (decision criterion) collapsed 
across recollection and familiarity responses using signal detection analysis.  We used 
a series of paired-samples t-tests to compare results between the remember/know test 
and source memory test,. Results revealed no significant difference in d’, t(24) = .976, 
p = .339, nor in c, t(24) = .409, p = .686 between the tests.  There was, however, a 
significant difference in reaction time with remember hits (M = 1.29 s, SD = .15 s) 
being made significantly faster than source hits (M= 1.69 s, SD = .17 s), t(24) = -
14.61, p < .001 and know hits (M = 1.58 s, SD = .20 s) being made significantly faster 
than no source hits (M = 1.74 s, SD = .18 s), t(29) = -5.20, p < .001. To ensure that 
this difference in reaction time was not driving any neural differences that we might 
find, we added reaction time into our model as a parametric modulator of the delta 
function used to model the neural activity (See Methods section 2.6).  There was also 
a significant difference in the amount of recollected trials between the 
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remember/know and source memory tests with a significantly higher number of 
remember hits (M = 76.8, SD = 24.0) than source hits (M = 64.0, SD = 24.6), t(24) = 
2.27, p = .032.  There was no significant difference between the number of know hits 
and the number of no source hits, t(24) = -1.648, p = .112.  For a summary of the 
behavioral results, see Table 1.   
Table 1  
 d’ c Rec rt*** Fam rt*** # of Rec Trials* # of Fam Trials 
Remember/ 
Know 
 
2.11 (.69) 
 
-.07 (.34) 
 
1.29 (.15) 
 
1.58 (.20) 
 
76.80 (24.05) 
 
51.12 (19.95) 
 
Source  
 
2.03 (.81) 
 
-.09 (.37) 
 
 
 
1.69 (.17) 
 
1.74 (.18) 
 
64.00 (24.62) 
 
59.88 (17.93) 
 
TABLE 1: Overall memory accuracy (d’) and response bias (c) are shown.  ‘Rec’ refers to recollection 
(either remember hits or source hits) and ‘Fam’ refers to familiarity (either know hits or no source hits), 
while ‘rt’ refers to reaction time.  Mean values are shown with their associated standard deviations in 
parentheses.  Significant differences between the tests are shown in bold font and the significance 
value is indicated with the associated star(s) (p < .05 = *, p < .001 = ***). 
 
fMRI results 
     Although some minor activation was found in the right hemisphere for the 
contrasts of interest, the following analyses focus mostly on the activation in the left 
hemisphere. The activity within the left hemisphere was significantly stronger and 
more consistent than that in the right hemisphere.  Additionally, it is activity within 
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the left hemisphere that is consistently reported in the memory retrieval literature. 
Recollection was operationalized for the remember/know test as the ‘Remember hits 
> Know hits’ contrast, and for the source test as the ‘Source hits > No Source hits’ 
contrast.  Familiarity was operationalized as the ‘Know hits > Correct rejections’ 
contrast for the remember/know test and as the ‘No Source hits > Correct rejections’ 
contrast for the source test. ‘Correct rejections’ included only those responses from 
that test (e.g. correct rejections in the source contrast only included correct rejections 
from the source test).  Unless otherwise specified, voxels were tested at a False 
Discovery Rate (FDR) adjusted p value of  < .05 with a voxel extent of 10.  
Brain regions activated by both tests   
     Despite which testing method was used, recollection activated relatively ventral 
PPC regions, while familiarity activated more dorsal PPC regions.  Specifically, 
recollection activated the left angular gyrus (BA 39).  Outside of the PPC, regions in 
the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 9 & 46), left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex 
(BA 45 & 47), regions within the left lateral temporal cortex (BA 22), as well as the 
posterior cingulate gyrus (BA 23 & 31) were also activated by both tests for 
recollection.  Defined by either test, familiarity activated the area around the 
intraparietal sulcus (IPS).  This activation extended dorsally into the superior parietal 
lobule (BA 7) and also into the more superior areas of the angular gyrus (BA) 39 and 
the supramarginal gyrus (BA 40).  Extensive familiarity-related activation was also 
found during both tests in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 9 & 46), left 
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ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (BA 44, 45, & 47), the precuneus (BA 7), and posterior 
cingulate gyrus (BA 23).  See Figure 1 for a visualization of these common 
activations.  See Table 2 for a list of peak voxel activations associated with these 
results. 
 
Figure 1: Brain regions identified by both tests at the group level. Blue indicates regions that were 
active for familiarity, red for recollection, and green represents regions that were active for both 
familiarity and recollection.  For visualization purpose, results were transformed to the PALS atlas and 
rendered onto 3D inflated brains using CARET software (Van Essen, Dickson, Harwell, Hanlon, 
Anderson, & Drury, 2001). Brodmann areas 7, 39, and 40 are indicated with the dotted line (defined by 
the BA list that comes with the CARET software).  
 
Table 2 
a.  Recollection-related activity 
X Y Z 
Coordinates 
(MNI) 
Hemi –
sphere 
    Brain Region BA t value Cluster 
size 
(voxels) 
-9   -43   34 Left Posterior Cingulate / 
Precuneus 
31 5.76 672 
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-3   -58   10 Left Posterior Cingulate 29 5.10 * 
-6   -58   28 Left Precuneus / Posterior 
Cingulate 
31 4.91 * 
-33   14   52 Left Middle / Superior Frontal 
Gyrus 
8 5.48 254 
-15   59   22 Left Superior Frontal Gyrus 10 5.38 * 
-6   50   31 Left Superior Frontal Gyrus 9 5.14 * 
-42   -67   46 Left Precuneus / Angular Gyrus 39 5.39 475 
-42   -73   31 Left Lateral Occipital Cortex / 
Angular Gyrus 
39 5.32 * 
-42   -49   37 Left Angular Gyrus 39 3.86 * 
-36   32   -11 Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47 5.25 198 
-24   32   -11 Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus 11 5.18 * 
-45   35   7 Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45 5.02 * 
-12   -73   -11 Left Lingual Gyrus 18 4.83 61 
-30   -37   -14 Left Parahippocampal Gyrus 36/37 4.70 51 
-18   -43   -11 Left Lingual Gyrus / 
Cerebellum 
 4.56 * 
-60   -37   -8 Left Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 4.16 34 
-57   -52   -8 Left Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 4.10 * 
24   -37   -11 Right Lingual Gyrus / 
Parahippocampal Gyrus 
36 4.08 22 
18   -88   31 Right Lateral Occipital Cortex / 
Cuneus 
19 3.82 21 
18   8   -11 Right Putamen  3.62 22 
12   11   -5 Right Caudate / Putamen  3.53 * 
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b.  Familiarity-related activity 
X Y Z 
Coordinates 
(MNI) 
Hemi -
sphere 
    Brain Region BA t value Cluster 
size 
(voxels) 
-45   -49   46 Left Supramarginal Gyrus / 
Angular Gyrus / Superior 
Parietal Lobule 
40/7 6.23 882 
-33   -70   52 Left Superior Parietal Lobule 7 6.19 * 
-9   -70   43 Left Precuneus 7 4.61 * 
-48   17   37 Left Middle Frontal Gyrus 9 5.94 1842 
-39   50   10 Left Middle Frontal Gyrus 10 5.61 * 
-6   23   49 Left Superior Frontal Gyrus 8 5.56 * 
-12   11   1 Left Caudate  5.59 65 
-12   11   10 Left Caudate  5.21 * 
-6   -28   25 Left Posterior Cingulate 23 5.19 140 
12   11   1 Right Caudate  4.53 62 
36   20   -2 Right Insular Cortex 47 4.20 101 
39   8   58 Right Middle Frontal Gyrus 6 3.90 40 
45   -58   52 Right Lateral Occipital Cortex / 
Angular Gyrus / Superior 
Parietal Lobule 
39/7 3.88 69 
-3   -25   -2 Left Thalamus  3.56 10 
-3   -25   -11 Left Brainstem  3.35 * 
48   29   37 Right Middle Frontal Gyrus 9 3.49 14 
TABLE 2: Information from peak voxels found by inclusively masking the ‘Remember Hits > Know 
Hits’ and ‘Source Hits > No Source Hits’ contrasts to represent recollectiona, and the ‘Know Hits > 
Correct Rejections’ and ‘No Source > Correct Rejections’ contrasts to represent familiarityb.  Closest 
Brodmann areas (BA) labels are provided when possible. * denotes that the peak voxel is part of the 
cluster in the row(s) directly above it.   
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Results from each test 
      In addition to the brain regions that were common to both tasks, some brain 
regions were uniquely identified depending on what test was used to operationalize 
recollection and familiarity. Of specific interest to this study, recollection-related 
activity was only seen in the supramarginal gyrus (BA 40) when it was 
operationalized by the remember/know test.  Familiarity, on the other hand, appeared 
to activate a larger portion of the superior parietal lobule (BA7) when operationalized 
by the source test.  See Figure 2 for the results of the second level of analysis 
independently for the remember/know test and for the source test. See Table 3 for a 
list of peak voxel activations associated with these results.   
   Remember Know Test                  Source Test 
       a.                     b.        
                      
                           Recollection                   
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         c.               d.  
                            
             Familiarity         
       
FIGURE 2:  Group-level results of Remember Hits > Know Hitsa, Source Hits > No Source Hits b, 
Know Hits > Correct Rejections c, and No Source Hits > Correct Rejections d For optimal visualization 
recollection is presented on a lateral view of the brain and familiarity is presented at a slightly more 
dorsal view. 
 
 
Table 3 
a.  Remember Hits > Know Hits 
X Y Z 
Coordinates 
(MNI) 
Hemi -
sphere 
    Brain Region BA t value Cluster    
size 
(voxels) 
-9    -43  34 Left Posterior Cingulate Gyrus 31 8.61 21030 
-30  -34  -14 Left Parahippocampal Gyrus 36 6.73 * 
-18   59  22 Left Superior Frontal Gyrus 9/46 7.94 20830 
-36    8   52 Left Middle Frontal Gyrus 6 7.93 * 
-42  -67  46 Left Lateral Occipital Cortex/ 
Angular Gyrus 
19/39 7.64 11170 
-54  -61  37 Left Supramarginal Gyrus/ 
Angular Gyrus 
40/39 6.95 * 
-36   32 -11 Left Inferior Frontal Gyrus 47 7.29 344 
-57   -28  -8 Left Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 7.28 434 
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30    -43  -8 Right Parahippocampal Gyrus 36 6.64 147 
51    -70  22 Right Angular Gyrus/Lateral 
Occipital Cortex 
39/19 5.63 57 
69    -25  4 Right Superior Temporal Gyrus 22 5.32 164 
54     35  4 Right Inferior Frontal Gyrus 45/46 5.20 59 
24   -82 40 Right Precuneus/Cuneus/     
Lateral Occipital Cortex 
19 4.79 79 
21  -88  31 Right Cuneus 18/19 4.55 * 
-45  -16  49 Left Postcentral Gyrus 3 4.49 24 
 
 
b.  Source Hits > No Source Hits 
X Y Z 
Coordinates 
(MNI) 
Hemi -
sphere 
    Brain Region BA t value Cluster 
size 
(voxels) 
-6   -58  28 Left Posterior Cingulate 
Gyrus/ Precuneus 
31 9.08 958 
-45  -67  19 Left Middle Temporal 
Gyrus/ Lateral Occipital 
Cortex 
37/19 5.98 490 
-39   -67  46 Left Lateral Occipital 
Cortex/ Angular Gyrus 
19/39 5.84 * 
-45    44   7 Left Middle Frontal Gyrus/ 
Inferior Frontal Gyrus 
10/46 5.97 292 
-9     56  34 Left Superior Frontal Gyrus 9 5.35 238 
36   -31  -11 Right Parahippocampal 
Gyrus/ Hippocampus 
37 5.02 86 
3      -1  31 Right Anterior Cingulate 
Gyrus 
24 4.80 27 
21    -1  -11 Right Amygdala  3.75 33 
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-24  -37   -17 Left Fusiform Cortex 20 4.53 47 
-18  -40  -8 Left Parahippocampal Gyrus 36 4.12 * 
39  - 79    1 Right Lateral Occipital Cortex 19 4.44 51 
18  - 49   40 Right Precuneus 31 4.37 11 
36   -31   52 Right Postcentral Gyrus 3 4.28 18 
-12  -79  -2 Left Lingual Gyrus 18 4.25 56 
 
c.  Know Hits > Correct Rejections 
X Y Z 
Coordinates 
(MNI) 
Hemi -
sphere 
    Brain Region BA t value Cluster 
size 
(voxels) 
-45  -49  46 Left Superior Parietal 
Lobule/ Supramarginal 
Gyrus 
7/40 10.04 933 
-9   -70   43 Left Precuneus 7 5.92 * 
-48  17  37 Left Middle Frontal Gyrus 8/9 9.12 26220 
-39   50  10 Left Middle Frontal Gyrus  10 8.20 * 
-6    23   49 Left Superior Frontal Gyrus 8 8.05  * 
-3  -16  31 Left Anterior Cingulate 
Gyrus 
23 6.16 250 
-60  -43  -5 Left Middle Temporal Gyrus 20/21 5.25 73 
36    20   -2 Right Insula 47/13 5.17 141 
42   47   16 Right Middle Frontal Gyrus 10 4.77 59 
45  -58  52 Right Superior Parietal 
Lobule/ Angular Gyrus 
7/39 4.63 117 
48  -49  43 Right Angular Gyrus/ 
Supramarginal Gyrus 
39/40 4.56 * 
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d.  No Source Hits > Correct Rejections 
X Y Z 
Coordinates 
(MNI) 
Hemi -
sphere 
  Brain Region BA t value Cluster 
size 
(voxels) 
36  -73  40 Right Precuneus 19 9.86 18730 
-30  -67  49 Left  Precuneus/Lateral 
Occipital Cortex 
19 8.88 * 
-45  -49  46 Left Angular Gyrus/ 
Supramarginal Gyrus/ 
Superior Parietal Lobule 
39/40/7 8.86 * 
-48   11   37 Left Middle Frontal Gyrus 9 7.74 21140 
36     5    61 Right Middle Frontal Gyrus 6 6.79 186 
-3    -28  31 Left Posterior Cingulate 
Gyrus 
23 6.78 151 
30    23   -5 Right Insula 13 5.73 121 
-18  -79  -11 Left Fusiform Gyrus 18/19 5.06 64 
51     32   28 Right Middle Frontal Gyrus 9 4.82 70 
 
TABLE 3: Information from peak voxels for Remember Hits > Know Hitsa, Source Hits > No Source 
Hitsb, Know Hits > Correct Rejectionsc, and No Source Hits > Correct Rejectionsd contrasts from the 
group analysis.  Closest Brodmann areas (BA) labels are provided when possible. * denotes that the 
peak voxel is part of the cluster in the row(s) directly above it.   
 
 
Direct comparisons between tests 
 
     To specifically compare the results of the two methods, the contrasts that were 
used to define recollection and familiarity at the first level of analysis for each test 
were statistically compared. Specifically, activation resulting from each subject’s 
‘Source Hits > No Source Hits’ contrast (source recollection) was subtracted from 
their ‘Remember Hits > Know Hits’ contrast (remember/know recollection).  
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Similarly, for familiarity, activation resulting from each subject’s ‘No Source Hits > 
Correct Rejections’ contrast (source familiarity) was subtracted from their ‘Know 
Hits > Correct Rejections’ contrast (remember/know familiarity). The resulting 
difference t-maps (with positive values indicating brain regions that were more active 
during the remember/know test compared to the source test) were then brought up to 
the second-level of analysis and compared against zero using a one-sample t-test at 
each voxel across the brain.  These results are described below and are shown in 
Figure 3ab.   
     Since recollection is defined by subtracting out activity to familiarity hits, we 
wanted to ensure that any neural difference observed between recollection was truly 
due to differences in recollected hits, and not to differences to familiarity hits.  
Therefore, at the first-level of analysis, a ‘Remember Hits > Source Hits’ contrast was 
generated for each subject.  The same argument holds for familiarity.  To ensure that 
the neural differences observed were not due to differences to correct rejections, a 
‘Know Hits > No Source Hits’ contrast was generated for each subject. The resulting 
t-maps were brought up to the second level of analysis and compared against zero 
using a one-sample t-test at each voxel across the brain. These results are described 
below and are shown in Figure 3cd.   
     Results from both of these analyses show that the ventral region of the left PPC 
(specifically the supramarginal gyrus) was significantly more active when 
recollection was indexed by the remember/know test compared to when it was 
indexed by the source test.  Conversely, the dorsal PPC region was significantly more 
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active when familiarity was indexed by the source test compared to when it was 
indexed by the remember/know test.  
a.      Recollection: RK > Source  b.       Familiarity: RK > Source             
                
 
c. Recollection: R hits > Source hits  d. Familiarity: K hits >No Source hits
    
                         
                                                
FIGURE 3 Group-results (p < .001, voxel extent = 10) for Recollectionac and Familiaritybd.  Contrasts 
show the difference between the remember/know and source tasks for recollectiona and familiarityb.  
Also shown are the contrasts between ‘remember hits > source hits’c and ‘know hits > no source hits’d..  
 
Regions of Interest (ROI) Analysis 
     Percent signal change from (implicit) baseline was calculated for each event type 
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for each subject. To calculate the percent signal change associated with  recollection 
and familiarity, the following subtractions were performed:  ‘Remember hits – Know 
hits’,  ‘Source hits – No Source hits’, ‘Know hits – Correct Rejections’, and ‘No 
Source hits – Correct Rejections’. These differences represent the percent signal 
change for remember/know recollection, source recollection, remember/know 
familiarity, and source familiarity respectively.  Figure 4 shows the mean (across 
subjects) percent signal change for these events calculated within the left angular 
gyrus (BA 39) and left superior parietal lobule (BA 7) for recollection and familiarity 
respectively.  Although the left angular gyrus was active for recollection during both 
tests, results from a paired samples t-test revealed a significant difference in the mean 
percent signal change between recollection indexed by the remember/know test (M 
= .18, SD = .12) and recollection indexed by the source test (M = .09, SD = .08), t(24) 
= 3.88, p < .001, with the remember/know test significantly activating this region 
more than the source test.  Similarly, while both tests activated the superior parietal 
lobule during familiarity, a paired samples t-test revealed a significant difference 
between familiarity as defined by the remember/know test (M = .05, SD = .10) and by 
the source test (M = .13, SD = .14), t(24) = -3.01, p = .006, with the source test 
significantly activating this region more than the remember/know test.   
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FIGURE 4:  Mean (across subjects) percent signal change for recollection and familiarity. On the left 
is the change in signal in the left angular gyrus (BA 39) for remember hits (blue) and for source hits 
(red). On the right is the change in signal in the left superior parietal lobule (BA 7) for know hits (blue) 
and no source hits (red). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. Significance values are 
indicated with the associated number of stars (p < .01 = **, p < .001 = ***). 
 
Discussion 
Summary of current findings 
     The current design allowed for the direct comparison of the neural correlates of 
recollection and familiarity as operationalized by the remember/know and source 
memory procedures.  Results revealed large areas of convergence, namely familiarity-
related activity within the superior parietal lobule and recollection-related activity 
within the angular gyrus.  In addition to this overlap, striking divergent activations 
were also observed between the testing methods.  Within the left PPC, the magnitude 
of activation significantly differed between testing method. Although both tests 
revealed familiarity-related activity within the SPL, this activity was greater when 
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familiarity was indexed by the source test compared to when it was indexed by the 
remember/know test. While both tests showed recollection-related activity within the 
left IPL, specifically in the left angular gyrus, this activation was significantly greater 
when recollection was probed by the remember/know test compared to the source test 
(as evidenced in the ROI analysis).  
     Beyond differences in magnitude, the extent of activity also varied between testing 
procedure. When familiarity was assessed using the source test, activation spread 
more dorsally, covering a greater extent of the left SPL.  When the remember/know 
paradigm was used, familiarity-related activation spread slightly more ventrally into 
the superior regions of the left supramarginal and angular gyri. Turning to activity 
related to recollection, the most striking regional differences were observed. While 
source memory recollection was confined to the more posterior portion of the IPL, 
namely the angular gyrus, remember/know recollection extended well into the 
supramarginal gyrus and into the temporo-parietal junction (TPJ).  
Relation to previous findings 
   Previous research has found a similar difference in the magnitude of recollection 
and familiarity-related activations between the remember/know and source test 
procedures.    In a meta-analysis, Ciaramelli et al. (2008) compared the results from 
nine experiments using the remember/know paradigm with 11 experiments using a 
source memory test. Results showed that the left SPL was associated with higher 
levels of activity when using source memory compared to the remember/know 
procedure.  Conversely, regions within the left IPL were more strongly activated by 
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experiments that used the remember/know test compared to those using tests of 
source memory.  The current experiment replicated these findings within the same 
group of subjects.  This finding is important because it shows that this differential 
activation is still present even when confounding variables such as differences in 
stimuli, analysis technique, scanner protocols, specific subjects tested, etc. are held 
constant.  Thus, this difference is most likely truly attributable to differences in task 
demands and not to differences in extraneous variables that were previously free to 
vary between testing procedure.   
     Turning to differences in the extent of activity, this difference was most 
noteworthy in the activity associated with recollection.  While both tests activated the 
angular gyrus, only the remember/know test additionally activated the supramarginal 
gyrus.  In these analyses, a more lenient threshold of uncorrected p < .001 was used in 
these direct comparisons because the analyses were testing the significant difference 
between differences.  Although a more liberal threshold was used, the specific lateral 
parietal area of significant activity (the left supramarginal gyrus) was precisely the 
area predicted by the previous analyses that used a more conservative threshold. In 
addition to this, the extent of activity was relatively large (257 voxels).  Therefore we 
feel confident that the result of this analysis is not merely a reflection of spurious 
activity.  Although it is unclear why only subjective measures of recollection 
activated this anterior region of the IPL, there is some literature that supports this 
finding.   Using the combined remember/know & source memory paradigm, Yu et al. 
(2012) found that the angular gyrus was active for recollection using either testing 
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method, but a cluster within the supramarginal gyrus/TPJ was active for recollection 
only as indexed by the remember/know test.  The results of the current experiment 
replicate these findings and more importantly show that these results can be found 
when using the traditional remember/know and source memory testing procedures, 
which allow recollection and familiarity to be operationalized independently by both 
testing methods.  
General Conclusions 
     While the ubiquitous dorsal/ventral dissociation between familiarity and 
recollection was found using both the remember/know test and the source memory 
procedure, further distinctions were found within the left parietal cortex when these 
two methods were directly compared. In the dorsal parietal regions, where activity is 
most likely reflecting a cognitive process related to memory retrieval, there was a 
significant difference in the magnitude of familiarity-related activity between the two 
tests.  This difference is most likely explained in terms of differences in task demands 
such as top-down attention or retrieval monitoring, between the source and 
remember/know tests.  In the ventral parietal regions, where there is less of a 
consensus in the literature, a difference not only in the magnitude of recollection-
related activity but also in the extent of this activity was observed between the two 
tests. If we do not look at this study in isolation, but instead combine results from 
other experimental techniques (structural and functional connectivity studies, patient 
data, etc.) it seems more likely that this differential activity is representing some 
difference in cognitive demands (i.e. bottom-up attention or self-referential 
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processing) between the tasks. Furthermore, if an episodic buffer theory is used to 
explain the differential ventral parietal activations, then one must assume that 
recollection is a graded, as opposed to a threshold (all-or-none) process, which is in 
debate in the literature (Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas, 1997; Yonelinas, 2001; but see 
Wixted, 2007; Mickes, Wais, & Wixted, 2009).  For these reasons, we assume the 
most parsimonious explanation of the differential ventral parietal activation observed 
in the current study is a reflection of a difference in some cognitive process(es) 
associated with each task.  Regardless of what theory is used to explain the 
differences observed, the fact that these differences exist between the tasks is enough 
to challenge the widely held belief that these two methods are functionally equivalent 
at separating the neural correlates of recollection and familiarity.  With such a heated 
debate in the memory literature as to what functional role(s) (if any) the parietal 
cortex is playing during memory retrieval, activation differences due simply to the 
procedure used to probe recollection and familiarity must be considered.   
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Chapter 3:  Experiments 2.  Modulations of Posterior Parietal Cortex Due to 
Changes in Base Rate Information 
 
Introduction 
     During a recognition memory test subjects are required to make a decision as to 
whether or not they have encountered each stimulus previously.  Clearly, these 
decisions rely upon the amount of mnemonic information available for each stimulus.  
Somewhat less obvious, is how these decisions involve quantifying how much 
mnemonic information is enough to conclude that a prior experience has occurred (i.e. 
that the stimulus is old).  This value, known as a subject’s criterion according to 
signal detection theory (Macmillan & Creelman,1990) has been shown to be 
influenced by several factors including: instructional motivation (Egan, 1958; 
Verfaellie, Giovanello, & Keane, 2001; Postma, 1999), payoff manipulations that 
preferentially reward correct ‘old’ or ‘new’ responses (Healy & Kubovy, 1978; Van 
Zandt, 2000), and manipulations of the (alleged or true) base rates of studied and new 
trials (Strack & Forster, 1996; Aminoff et al. 2014; Van Zandt, 2000, Verfaellie et al.; 
Hirshman & Henzler, 1998). For instance, if subjects are told that the base rate of 
studied (old) to non-studied (new) trials is 70% to 30% respectively, a shift in 
criterion is often observed, with subjects lowering their criterion to a more liberal 
setting, thus requiring less mnemonic evidence to make an ‘old’ response (Aminoff et 
al., 2012; Aminoff et al., 2014). 
     While several studies have investigated the influence of payoff manipulations on 
standard ‘old/new’ recognition responses, only a limited number have explored its 
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effect on ‘remember/know’ responses.  The results of which have been mixed, which 
has led to debate in the field as to the true nature of the dichotomy between these 
responses and if they truly reflect qualitatively different cognitive states.  As initially 
described, recollection (ostensibly represented by ‘remember’ responses) is typically 
thought of as a threshold process, in which it either occurs in full or does not occur at 
all (Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas, 1997, 2001).  As such, it is not usually thought of as 
being influenced by manipulations of a decision criterion.  Familiarity (ostensibly 
represented by ‘know’ responses) on the other hand, is usually described as varying in 
degree along a continuum of mnemonic evidence (Mandler, 1980).  This type of 
retrieval fits nicely with signal detection theory in which items that are associated 
with an amount of evidence (i.e. familiarity) that is above the criterion are classified 
as ‘old’ and those below are classified as ‘new’.  Therefore, when experimental 
manipulations affect criterion placement, they also affect familiarity responding.   
     Initial studies using the remember/know procedure supported this distinction 
between remember and know responses, finding that only know responses were 
affected by manipulations of criterion (Strack & Forster, 1996).  However, additional 
studies have challenged this idea and have shown that under the right conditions, even 
remember responses can be affected by these manipulations (Hirshman & Henzler, 
1998).  To further complicate matters, some studies have shown that when ‘guess’ 
responses are given as an additional option at test, neither remember nor know 
response are affected by criterion manipulation (Gardiner, Richardson-Klavehn, & 
Ramponi, 1997).  As if that were not complicated enough, a major drawback to all of 
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these studies is their between-subjects design.  Extensive individual differences in the 
effectiveness of criterion manipulations have been shown to exist (Aminoff et al., 
2012; 2014).  Therefore, when comparing across individuals, it is impossible to 
determine how much of the difference between criterion levels is due to the 
experimental manipulation and how much is due to naturally-existing individual 
differences.   
     Turning to neuroimaging studies, there are even fewer experiments that have 
investigated the effects of criterion manipulations. These effects could be especially 
telling for areas within the posterior parietal cortex, whose function is still greatly 
debated in the field.  If this region is directly related to the temporary storage of 
mnemonic information (i.e. the episodic buffer theory), then its activity should not 
vary according to differences in base rates.  This is because there is no reason to 
believe that such a manipulation would have any effect on the amount of retrieved 
memory content itself, but instead, would have effects on extra-mnemonic functions 
such as target detection, adjustment of expectancies, an overriding of prepotent 
response tendencies, etc. Therefore, if activity within this region were found to be 
modulated by base rate information, it would provide evidence that it is not acting as 
an episodic buffer, but is instead functioning in some other cognitive process that aids 
memory retrieval but is not necessary for it to occur (i.e. allocating attention, subject 
awareness, etc.).   
     Some early electrophysiological studies have investigated the manipulation of base 
rate information on the ERP correlates of recognition memory.  As previously 
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described, there is the ‘parietal old/new’ ERP component that has been associated 
with successful retrieval (specifically with recollection) that presents itself as a 
positive-going waveform that is greater for hits than correct rejections.  Studies that 
varied the ratio of old and new items at test have found that the parietal old/new ERP 
component is invariant to this manipulation (Friedman, 1990; Herron et al., 2004; 
Smith & Guster, 1993) and as a result some have suggested that this component is a 
likely neural correlate of episodic recollection and not of extra-mnemonic processes 
that co-occur with retrieval (Friedman & Johnson, 2000; Rugg & Allan, 2000).   
     While informative, the spatial resolution offered by such ERP studies leaves a lot 
to be desired.  Fortunately, a handful of studies have followed up on these results 
using fMRI techniques in order to capitalize on its superior spatial resolution.  
Specifically, Herron, Henson, and Rugg (2004) varied the probability of old and new 
test items across three study-test cycles.  The ratio of old to new words differed in 
each test phase, and was either 25:75, 50:50, or 75:25.  Results of this manipulation 
depended upon what sub-region of the posterior parietal cortex was observed.  Within 
the superior parietal cortex (BA 7), there was a significant interaction with old/new 
ratio, where retrieval success effects varied according to whether old or new items 
were the rarer stimulus class, with the more infrequent items eliciting greater activity.  
Following the logic outlined above, the authors argued that these regions are unlikely 
to directly support the recovery or representation of stored mnemonic information.  In 
direct contrast to this finding, regions within the inferior parietal cortex (BA 39) that 
were sensitive to the ‘hits > correct rejections’ contrast were found not to be sensitive 
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to the probability manipulation.  The authors took this to as evidence that this region 
was directly related to memory processes per se and not to extra-mnemonic processes 
occurring during retrieval.   
     However, a major limitation of this study was the lack of a behavioral shift in 
response patterns between the test phases.  There was no effective change in criterion 
placement across the different probability conditions.  Without a behavioral shift in 
performance, it is difficult to interpret the null effect that was found.  There could 
have been no modulation in parietal activity because this region is directly related to 
memory representations (as argued by the authors), but could just as easily be 
explained by a lack of statistical power.  Perhaps the criterion manipulation was not 
strong enough to induce a neural modulation.  In fact, the authors admit that this 
failure to find a probability effect on response bias was inconsistent with some 
previous reports (e.g. Ratcliff, Sheu, & Gronlund, 1992).  It was suggested by Herron 
et al. (2004) that a possible reason for this disparity may be because subjects in this 
study were not explicitly informed about the ratio changes in each block (i.e. what the 
probabilities would be) but instead were only made aware that changes would occur 
across blocks.  An even more crucial and obvious instructional difference is the fact 
that the experimenters instructed their subjects to try not to allow the change in base 
rates to ‘influence their recognition judgments’ (Herron et al., 2004, page 3).   
     Fortunately, a more recent study by Aminoff et al. (2014) was able to replicate the 
results found within the superior parietal cortex.  This study was much larger (N = 
95) and had subjects participate in two recognition memory tests (one using words as 
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stimuli, the other using faces) while their neural activity was collected via fMRI.  
Again, base rate information was manipulated across testing blocks such that some 
blocks contained 70% old items and some contained only 30% old items.  Unlikely 
the Herron study, subjects were explicitly made aware of the changes in base rates 
between blocks.  Maybe as a result of this, subjects did shift their criterion 
appropriately (although less than optimally) between the high and low probability 
conditions, adopting a more lenient criterion in the high probability condition where 
items were more likely to be old.  As with the Herron study, regions within the 
superior parietal cortex (BA 7) were found to be modulated by probability 
manipulation.  Although a full cross-over effect was not found (i.e. correct rejections 
were not found to elicit more activity than hits in the high probability condition), the 
old/new effect was almost completely eliminated during the high probability 
condition.  Furthermore, when the data were split into two groups of subjects based 
on whether they shifted their criterion between blocks or not, the parietal old/new 
effect was robust for the group that shifted and essentially non-existent for the group 
who did not.  Additionally, regions of interest (ROI) analyses in this study showed a 
strong correlation between subjects’ criterion placement and amount of dorsal parietal 
activity during the ‘hits > correct rejections’ contrast.  This converging evidence 
strongly suggests that the superior parietal activity seen during successful retrieval is 
at least partially related to non-mnemonic processes that occur during recognition.   
     Although very informative, one major limitation of both of these studies, was that 
responses were not separated according to whether they were recognized by 
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recollection or familiarity.  Subjects performed a standard recognition memory task 
and simply responded ‘old’ or ‘new’ to each item.  Additionally, recognition accuracy 
(as measured by d’) was admittedly low in the study by Aminoff and colleagues.  
This was intentionally done so that subjects would be more inclined to use the 
probability manipulation to guide their memory responses.  Although successful in 
their goal of getting subjects to shift criterion between probability blocks, this low 
memory performance most likely limited retrieval to familiarity-based responses with 
very little, if any, recollection occurring.  As a result, these studies cannot speak to 
the distinct effect criterion manipulations may have on the neural correlates of 
recollection and familiarity.   
     An fMRI study conducted by Vilberg and Rugg (2009) sought to expand these 
initial findings from the Herron study.  Like the Herron study, old/new ratios were 
varied between testing conditions, with 25% of items being old in one block and 75% 
old in another block.  Additionally, they investigated the effects of varying old/new 
ratio on the neural correlates of successful versus unsuccessful source memory.  As 
previously described, source memory, like the remember/know paradigm, is a 
common way of segregating items recognized with familiarity from those recognized 
with recollection.  The authors first looked at generic retrieval success effects 
(regardless of source information) and found two regions within the more superior 
parietal areas (specifically an anterior and a posterior region along the intraparietal 
sulcus) to be modulated by the probability condition.  These old/new effects were 
robust in the low probability condition (25% old) but greatly attenuated during the 
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high probability condition (75% old).  Somewhat surprisingly, a larger region within 
the middle intraparietal sulcus was found not to be modulated by the probability 
change.  Turning to regions that demonstrated recollection-related effects (as 
operationalized by correct source retrieval), this involved more inferior parietal areas, 
specifically a region within the posterior angular gyrus.  This region, like the middle 
intraparietal sulcus was not shown to be sensitive to the change in probability.  
Regardless of the ratio of old to new items, this region showed maximal activity to 
hits compared to correct rejections, particularly to hits that were associated with the 
correct source attribution.  The authors argued that these probability-insensitive 
regions were likely candidates for supporting processes directly related to memory 
retrieval and that the angular gyrus in particular may be recruited for recollection-
related retrieval.   
     While successful in segregating familiarity and recollection related responses, this 
study was unsuccessful in inducing a behavioral change in response bias between the 
testing conditions.  Like the Herron et al. (2004) study, the subjects in this study were 
not made explicitly aware of the change in base rates between conditions and were 
instructed not to let any apparent change in base rate affect their recognition decisions. 
Additionally, in this experiment subjects were told to make a new response either 
when they were sure the item was new or when they were uncertain if it was old.  
They were instructed only to respond old if they were confident in their recognition.  
Such instructions have been shown to increase subjects’ criterion level, requiring a 
relatively higher amount of mnemonic information in order to respond old (Postma, 
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1999).  This instruction was the same across testing condition, and therefore may 
have induced a relatively strict criterion across both testing conditions, leaving little 
opportunity for the base rate information to have an effect on their response patterns.  
Therefore, it is once again difficult to interpret the null effect of probability 
manipulation on the neural correlates of recognition responses.  Another potential 
limitation in this study was the use of the source test as a means of operationalizing 
recollection and familiarity.  As has been shown in a review paper by Ciaramelli et al. 
(2008) and in the first experiment outlined in this dissertation, much more ventral 
parietal activity is found when using the remember/know approach, compared to the 
source task paradigm, to operationalize recollection.  This may explain why the 
ventral parietal activity in this experiment was relatively dorsal (located just inferior 
to the intraparietal sulcus) and posterior (restricted to the angular gyrus) compared to 
previous reports of recollection-related retrieval.   
     The current experiment intends to expand upon these previous findings by 
manipulating old/new ratios during a remember/know memory test.  Subjects will 
participate in eight memory test sessions, some of which will contain 70% old items 
and some will contain only 30% old items.  Subjects will be made explicitly aware of 
these probability manipulations in the hopes that they will use this information to 
guide their memory decisions.  In order to separate responses made via familiarity 
from those made by recollection, subjects will make either a ‘know’ or a ‘remember’ 
respectively.  Recognition performance will aim to be higher than the previous 
experiment by Aminoff et al. (2014) so that recollection-related retrieval will be more 
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likely to occur, but low enough that subjects will use the probability information to 
guide their memory decisions when they are unsure of their response.  It is predicted 
that ‘know’ responses will activate relatively dorsal parietal regions and that these 
responses and the associated neural activity will be modulated by the changes in base 
rate information.  Specifically, it is predicted that the dorsal parietal regions will be 
more active during the unlikely (30% old) condition.  ‘Remember’ responses are 
predicted to activate relatively ventral parietal sub-regions.  However, due to the 
mixed results of behavioral experiments and to the lack of a behavioral effect in the 
Vilberg & Rugg study, it is not clear at this point whether this probability 
manipulation will at all affect remember responses or its associated parietal activity.  
If activity in this ventral region is found to be modulated by this manipulation, then 
this would be evidence that this region, like the more dorsal parietal area, is reflecting 
some extra-mnemonic cognitive process that is associated with memory retrieval as 
opposed to directly reflecting the retrieved memory content itself.   
Methods 
Subjects 
     Twenty-four healthy subjects (15 female) took part in this study. Subjects ranged 
in age from 19 – 34 years old (M = 24.4, SD = 4.7). Data from three additional 
subjects were not included in any reported analyses (one due to a failure to complete 
all functional runs, one due to a technical failure, and one subject did not make any 
remember responses). All subjects were native English speakers and right-handed.  
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All subjects gave informed consent as approved by the UCSB Institutional Review 
Board and were paid for their participation.  
Stimuli 
     Stimuli consisted of 640 nouns selected using the MRC Psycholinguistic Database 
(www.psy.uwa.edu.au/mrcdatabase/uwa_mrc.htm).  For counterbalancing purposes, 
words were pseudorandomly divided into two lists of 320 words each.  These lists 
were matched (as closely as possible) on ratings of concreteness, familiarity, 
imagability, Kucera Francis written frequency, number of letters and number of 
syllables. Words were back projected onto a screen at the head of the scanner bore 
and were visible to the subject by a mirror mounted on the head coil.  Words were 
presented in the center of the screen in black 85-point Times New Roman font against 
a white background.  Stimulus presentation was controlled by a MacBook Pro laptop 
running Matlab R2008a version 7.6.0 (The Mathworks Inc., USA), using the 
Psychophysics Toolbox extensions (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner, et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997).   
Procedure 
     Before entering the scanner, subjects engaged in a short practice session that 
mimicked what they would experience in the scanner. During this practice session, 
subjects studied a series of words and then participated in two practice test sessions 
where they completed two remember/know tests, one ‘likely’ and one ‘unlikely’. Just 
prior to the remember/know test, subjects were given explicit instructions and 
examples of when to make a ‘remember’ and a ‘know’ response.  These instructions 
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were modified versions from those previously used in the literature (Rajaram, 1993) 
(see Appendix for a copy of the test instructions). In an attempt to ensure that these 
instructions were understood, after completing the practice remember/know test, 
subjects were asked what specific details were recalled for the items that were given 
‘remember’ responses.  Subjects were not allowed to continue with the procedure 
until the experimenter was convinced that a proper understanding of when to make a 
‘remember’ vs. a ‘know’ response was achieved.  
      Once the practice session was successfully completed, the task consisted of four 
study runs and eight test runs.  The study sessions took place outside of the scanner, 
while the test sessions were conducted inside of the scanner. During each study run, 
72 words (for a total of 288 words) were presented one at a time on the screen for 2 
seconds followed by a blank screen for .5 seconds.  During each of the study runs, 
subjects were asked to make an ‘Abstract/Concrete’ decision about each word via a 
button press. After the fourth and final study run subjects were placed in the scanner 
and three anatomical scans were collected that collectively lasted approximately 10 
minutes.  Following this, subjects began the first of eight test runs. Each test run 
consisted of 80 words, for a total of 640 test words. For three of the test runs, subjects 
were correctly told that 70% (56 words) would be from the study session, and for five 
of the test runs only 30% (24 words) would be from the test session.  These test runs 
were described as ‘Likely’ and ‘Unlikely’ respectively and the word ‘Likely’ or 
‘Unlikely’ remained on the top of the screen throughout the test phase.  The reason 
for the unmatched number of likely and unlikely runs was done in attempt to increase 
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the number of hits during the unlikely condition.  By definition, the unlikely runs 
have a lower number of old items and this number is further decreased by the 
segregation of hits into remember and know responses.  In order to ensure that 
enough trials of each type (<15) were made, the number of unlikely runs was 
increased from three to five.   
     Each word was displayed on the screen for 2.7 seconds followed by a blank screen 
for .5 seconds.  Subjects were instructed to make a ‘remember’, a ‘know’, or a ‘new’ 
response for each word.  Specifically, a ‘remember’ response was to be made when 
recollection occurred, a ‘know’ response when familiarity was used to make their 
decision, or a ‘new’ response if they believed the word was not seen during the study 
session. a response scale appeared on the screen below the word to help subjects 
remember which button mapped onto which response option.  Subjects alternated 
between ‘Likely’ and ‘Unlikely’ runs, with the order pseudo-randomized between 
subjects.   
     After a preliminary analysis of the first 16 subjects, activity within the ventral 
parietal cortex (associated with remember responses) seemed markedly attenuated 
from the results observed in the first experiment of this dissertation.  We were not 
sure what was causing this attenuation, but believed it may have been due to the 
addition of probability information to the design of the experiment.  As a result, we 
had 6 of the subjects come back for an additional day where they performed the exact 
same task except the old/new ratio was 50/50 for each test run.  For the remaining 
subjects that we had yet to scan, we also had them complete this additional day of 
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scanning with a neutral (50/50) old/new ratio condition.  In total, 13 subjects 
completed this neutral condition, however three were not included in the final 
analysis (two due to a technical failure and one subject did not make any remember 
responses), leaving 10 subjects included in the analyses. 
     Assignment of words to test condition and to old/new status was pseudo-
randomized between subjects.  All responses were made using an MRI-compatible 
button box held in their right hand. To enable event-related analysis, 44 fixation trials 
were added to each test run. The order of stimulus events during study and test runs 
was pre-determined by a genetic algorithm that optimized the design efficiency for 
the old/new contrast (Wager and Nichols, 2003).  
MRI Data Acquisition 
     A 3T Siemens TIM Trio scanner with a standard 12-channel head coil located at 
the UCSB Brain Imaging Center was used to scan all subjects. Earplugs were 
provided to minimize noise disturbance and cushions were placed around the subjects’ 
head to minimize movement.  A high-resolution anatomical image was collected for 
each subject using a magnetization-prepared rapid acquisition gradient-echo sequence 
(MPRAGE) with TR = 2.3s, TE = 2.98ms, and FA = 9°.  Each volume was collected 
with 3-D acquisition and consisted of 160 sagittal slices that were each 1.1 mm thick 
with 1 mm x 1 mm in-plane resolution.  The eight functional runs consisted of a T2*-
weighted single shot gradient-echo, echo planar image (EPI) sequence sensitive to the 
BOLD contrast with TR = 1.6s, TE = 30ms, and FA = 90°. Volumes were acquired 
	   83	  
parallel to the AC-PC plane in an interleaved pattern using generalized 
autocalibrating partially parallel acquisitions (GRAPPA). Each volume consisted of 
30 slices that were each 3mm thick with a .5 mm gap and a 3 mm x 3 mm in-plane 
resolution. The first four volumes of each functional scan were discarded to allow 
equilibration of tissue magnetization.  
Preprocessing of MRI Data 
     SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience) was used to perform 
standard spatial preprocessing of the MRI data.  All functional images were realigned 
to the first volume of the first functional scan using a least squares approach and a 6 
parameter (rigid body) spatial transformation.  During realignment, images were 
unwarped in order to minimize variance caused by the susceptibility-by-movement 
interaction (Andersson, et al., 2001). The functional images were then coregistered to 
the anatomical image using the mean functional image generated during realignment.  
Next, using standard segmentation procedures, the anatomical T1 image was 
segmented into images of grey matter, white matter, and cerebral spinal fluid.   These 
images were then spatially normalized to the ICBM Tissue Probabilistic Atlases that 
come standard in SPM8.  The parameters of this transformation were then applied to 
the functional images, which were re-sampled to 3 mm isotropic voxels.  Finally, the 
normalized images were spatially smoothed using an isotropic Gaussian kernel with 
an FWHM = 8 mm.  
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Analysis of Functional Data 
     SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience) was used for further data 
analysis. Neural activity at stimulus onset was modeled using a delta (stick) function 
that was convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function (HRF). To 
account for differences in response time reaction time was entered into the model as a 
parametric modulator of the HRF using a first-order linear transform of the delta 
function.  Data across the eight functional runs was concatenated, and session-
specific regressors were added into the model.  Thirteen event-types were modeled in 
total.  Remember Hits, Know Hits, Correct Rejections, Misses, Know False Alarms, 
and Remember False Alarms were modeled separately for the Likely and Unlikely 
runs and there was an additional event-type of No Interest, which was comprised of 
trials with omitted or multiple responses.  The data was high-pass filtered at 128s and 
an AR(1) model was used to estimate and correct for non-sphericity of the error 
covariance (Friston, et al., 2002).  The general linear model (GLM) was used to 
obtain parameter estimates of events of interest and subsequent contrast t-maps were 
created for each subject.  These contrast maps were then passed on to a second-level 
random-effects analysis that consisted of testing the contrast against zero using a one-
sample t- test independently at each voxel across the brain.  
Regions of Interest (ROI) Analysis 
     Marsbar (Brett, Anton, Valabreque, & Poline, 2002) was used to create and 
analyze BOLD activation from regions of interest (ROIs).  Structural ROIs were 
	   85	  
determined according to the AAL atlas that is included with the Marsbar software 
package.  Two functional ROIs were created, one to test the familiarity-related 
activity within the dorsal parietal regions and another to test the recollection-related 
activity within the ventral parietal regions.  The familiarity-related ROI was taken 
from the Aminoff et al. (2014) experiment mentioned previously in which peak 
activation was found during the ‘hits > correct rejections’ contrast.  The ROI was 
10mm in diameter and centered on the point x = -32, y = -50, z = 44.  For the 
recollection-related ROI, whole-brain fMRI results were collapsed across all eight 
runs (across likely and unlikely conditions) and the peak voxel of activity from the 
‘remember hits > know hits’ contrast was used as the center of the ROI.  The center 
fell on the point x = -42, y = -55, z = 25 and was 10mm in diameter.  For these ROIs, 
the mean percent signal change from baseline within that region was calculated for 
each event type.  Values representing recollection and familiarity were then 
calculated for each subject by subtracting the percent signal change from the 
appropriate events (e.g. subtracting the percent signal change to know hits from the 
percent signal change to remember hits for remember/know recollection).  These 
values were then averaged across subjects to obtain a mean percent signal change 
value for each contrast of interest.     
 
Results 
Behavioral Results 
     Subjects’ memory accuracy and decision criterion were measured by d’ and c 
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respectively using signal detection theory.  For both measures three values were 
calculated: one for overall recognition (collapsed across remember and know 
responses), one for recollection (remember responses), and one for familiarity (know 
responses).  A series of paired samples t-tests were conducted to compare the results 
between likely and unlikely conditions.  Results revealed no significant difference in 
overall d’, t(23) = -9.54, p = .350, nor in recollection d’, t(23) = -.242, p = .811.  
There was however, a significant difference in familiarity d’, with the unlikely 
condition (M = .35, SD = .52) being significantly higher than the likely condition (M 
= .21, SD = .58), t(23) = -2.70, p = .01.  Follow-up analyses revealed that this 
difference was due to a change in know responses to new items (i.e. false alarms) 
between conditions, with significantly more false alarms during the likely condition 
(M = .24, SD = .14) than during the unlikely condition (M = .17, SD = .09), t(23) = 
4.124, p < .001.  Although there was also a significant difference in know hits 
between conditions, the magnitude of this difference was much less (likely M = .30 vs. 
unlikely M = .26) and thus the difference in memory performance emerged.  In 
addition to hit and false alarm rates, the rate of correct rejections was also compared 
between probability conditions.  Results revealed a significant difference, with a 
higher correct rejection rate during the unlikely condition (M = .78, SD = .11) 
compared to the likely condition (M = .70, SD = .16), t(23) = -4.245, p < .001.   
     Importantly, a significant difference was found between overall criterion (c values) 
between the two probability conditions, with subjects adopting a more liberal 
criterion (M = -.18, SD = .40) during the likely condition compared to the unlikely 
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condition (M = .03, SD = .37), t(23) = -4.030, p = .001.  When looked at separately, 
this difference was also significant for familiarity criterion (likely M = .68 vs. 
unlikely M = .85), t(23) = -3.661, p = .001, but no significant difference was found 
for recollection criterion, t(23) = -1.482, p = .152.  For reaction time, the only 
significant differences between probability conditions were for remember hits and for 
correct rejections.  Remember hits were made significantly faster during the likely 
condition (M = 1.23, SD = .23) compared to the unlikely condition (M = 1.26, SD 
= .23), t(23) = -4.126, p < .001.  On the other hand, correct rejections were made 
significantly faster during the unlikely condition (M = 1.33, SD = .19) compared to 
the likely condition (M = 1.37, SD = .20), t(23) = 2.142, p = .043.  Refer to table 4 for 
a summary of these results.   
 
Table 4 
                       d’  
 overall          rec             fam 
                        c 
   overall            rec             fam 
Likely 1.53 (.48) 1.80 (.61) .21 (.58)* -.18 (.40)** .89 (.47) .68 (.40)** 
Unlikely 1.58 (.55) 1.82 (.50) .35 (.52)* .03 (.37)** .94 (.51) .85 (.30)** 
 
TABLE 4:  Memory accuracy (d’) and response bias (c) are shown.  ‘Overall’ refers to recognition 
collapsed across remember and know responses, ‘rec’ refers to recollection (remember responses) and 
‘fam’ refers to familiarity (know responses).  Significant differences between the likely and unlikely 
conditions are shown in bold font and the significance value is indicated with the associated star(s) (p 
= .01 = *, p = .001 = **). 
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fMRI Results 
     Familiarity was operationalized as the ‘know hits > correct rejections’ contrast and 
recollection as the ‘remember hits > know hits’ contrast.  This was done separately 
for the likely and unlikely conditions.  As with experiment 1 in this dissertation, the 
following analyses focus mostly on the activation in the left hemisphere. The activity 
within the left hemisphere was significantly stronger and more consistent than that in 
the right hemisphere.  Additionally, it is activity within the left hemisphere that is 
consistently reported in the memory retrieval literature.  Although a subset of subjects 
participated in a ‘neutral condition’ (50/50 old/new ratio), no significant neural 
difference was found within the parietal regions when results from this condition 
were compared to the likely and unlikely probability conditions.  Therefore, all results 
reported are restricted to data collected during the likely and unlikely conditions.  
Unless otherwise specified, voxels were tested at a value of p < .001 with a voxel 
extent of 10.   
Familiarity & Recollection  
     During both the likely and unlikely conditions, familiarity (know hits > correct 
rejections) activated regions within the left prefrontal cortex and areas within the left 
superior parietal lobule, specifically BA 7.  However, the magnitude of this activity as 
well as its spatial extent was greater during the unlikely condition.  During the 
unlikely condition, familiarity-related activity extended more superiorly and 
posteriorly into the superior parietal lobule.  Recollection-related activity (remember 
hits > know hits) was confined to more ventral regions of the lateral parietal cortex.  
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While this contrast revealed relatively robust activity within the supramarginal gyrus 
(BA 40) and angular gyrus (BA 39) in the likely condition, this activity was greatly 
attenuated in the unlikely condition.  Since the behavioral results revealed a 
significant difference in correct rejection rate between conditions, we decided to 
additionally operationalize recollection as the ‘remember hits > correct rejections’ 
contrast within each condition.  Within the lateral parietal cortex, activity extended 
both superiorly and inferiorly from the intraparietal sulcus, reaching areas within BA 
7, BA 39, and BA 40 for both conditions.  Results from this contrast mirror what was 
found in the previous contrasts, with more dorsal activity during the unlikely 
condition and more ventral activity observed during the likely condition.  For a 
complete list of peak voxel activations associated with these results, see Table 5.   
 
A.  Familiarity Activity 
            Overall                                 Likely                      Unlikely
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B.	  	  Recollection	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FIGURE 5: Group-results (p < .001, voxel extent = 10) for FamiliarityA and RecollectionB.  Familiarity was 
defined by the ‘Know hits > Correct rejections’ contrast while recollection was defined by the ‘Remember 
hits > Know hits’ contrast.  Results are shown for all eight runs collapsed across likely and unlikely 
conditions (overall), as well as separately for likely and unlikely runs.	  
 
Table 5 
A.  Familiarity-Related Activity  
X Y Z 
Coordinates 
(MNI) 
Hemi -
sphere 
    Brain Region BA t value Cluster 
size 
(voxels) 
-9   26   43 Left Superior Frontal Gyrus 32 7.07 365 
-9   17   52 Left Superior Frontal Gyrus 6 6.56 * 
15    17   64 Right Superior Frontal Gyrus 6 4.53 * 
-48  -46   55 Left Superior Parietal Lobule 7 6.60 397 
-45  -55   49 Left Superior Parietal Lobule 7 6.21 * 
-30  -58   40 Left Superior Parietal Lobule 7/19 5.46 * 
-42   53   10 Left Middle Frontal Gyrus 46 5.53 425 
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-45   50     1 Left Middle Frontal Gyrus 46 5.38 * 
-48   32    31 Left Middle Frontal Gyrus 9 4.61 * 
-9    -67    40 Left Precuneus 7 5.33 90 
-36     5    52 Left Middle Frontal Gyrus 6 4.69 67 
-33    11   40 Left Middle Frontal Gyrus  3.90 * 
-3     -22   28 Left Posterior Cingulate 
Gyrus 
23 4.60 26 
12     29    28 Right Anterior Cingular Gyrus 32 4.37 18 
12     14    10 Right Caudate  4.16 17 
39    -58   43 Right Superior Parietal 
Lobule/Lateral Occipital 
Cortex 
7/19 4.11 14 
36     23     4 Right Insular Cortex  3.82 20 
27     26    -2 Right Insular Cortex  3.61 * 
 
B.  Recollection-Related Activity 
X Y Z 
Coordinates 
(MNI) 
Hemi -
sphere 
    Brain Region BA t value Cluster 
size 
(voxels) 
-15    44   49 Left Superior Frontal Gyrus 8 6.13 74 
-21    32   49 Left Superior Frontal Gyrus 8 5.40 * 
-6      47   10 Left Medial Frontal Gyrus 9 5.82 384 
-9      59   22 Left Superior Frontal Gyrus 9 5.62 * 
-9      62   10 Left Medial Frontal Gyrus 10 5.35 * 
-39   -73    40 Left Angular Gyrus / Lateral 
Occipital Cortex 
39/19 5.27 101 
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-54   -61    25 Left Angular Gyrus 39 5.04 * 
-45   -67    40 Left Angular Gyrus 39 4.76 * 
-57   -19   -14 Left Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 5.14 19 
-57   -43     -5 Left Middle Temporal Gyrus 21 4.58 12 
-9    -58     16 Left Precuneus / Posterior 
Cingulate Cortex 
30 4.05 12 
 
TABLE 5: Information from peak voxels for Know Hits > Correct RejectionsA  and Remember Hits > 
Know HitsB, contrasts from the group analysis across all eight test runs (collapsed across likely and 
unlikely conditions).  Closest Brodmann areas (BA) labels are provided when possible. * denotes that 
the peak voxel is part of the cluster in the row(s) directly above it.   
 
Direct Comparisons 
     To directly compare the neural activity between the likely and unlikely conditions, 
a series of paired-samples t-tests were conducted.  No significant activations were 
found when familiarity-related activity was compared between conditions.  Similarly, 
when recollection was operationalized as the ‘remember hits > know hits’ contrast, no 
differences in active voxels were revealed.  However, when recollection was 
operationalized as the ‘remember hits > correct rejections’ contrast, a region within 
the left ventral parietal cortex, specifically within the angular gyrus, was revealed to 
be more active during the likely condition compared to the unlikely condition.  
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FIGURE 6: Group-results (p < .001, voxel extent = 10) for Recollection as defined by the ‘Remember 
hits > Correct rejections’ contrast.  Results are shown separately for likely and unlikely conditions as 
well as the direct contrast for Likely > Unlikely runs.   
 
Table 6 
Recollection (Remember Hits > Correct Rejections):  Likely > Unlikely 
X Y Z 
Coordinates 
(MNI) 
Hemi -
sphere 
    Brain Region BA t value Cluster 
size 
(voxels) 
-15  -10  40 Left Cingulate Gyrus 24 5.32 28 
66   -43  19 Right Supramarginal Gyrus 40/22 4.82 13 
-45  -76  31 Left Angular Gyrus 39 4.60 95 
-39  -55  22 Left Angular Gyrus 39 4.16 * 
-51  -61  25 Left Angular Gyrus 39 3.90 * 
-3     44   -8 Left Anterior Cingulate 
Gyrus 
32 4.56 83 
-9     32   -8 Left Anterior Cingulate 
Gyrus 
24 4.44 * 
-3     56   -5 Left Medial Frontal Gyrus 10 4.24 * 
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-6    -52   28 Left Posterior Cingulate 
Gyrus 
31 4.09 41 
-9    -52   16 Left Posterior Cingulate 
Gyrus / Precuneus 
30 4.01 * 
TABLE 6: Information from peak voxels for likely recollection > unlikely recollection.  Recollection 
was defined as the ‘Remember hits > Correct rejections’ contrast.  Closest Brodmann areas (BA) labels 
are provided when possible. * denotes that the peak voxel is part of the cluster in the row(s) directly 
above it.   
 
Results Based on Criterion-Shifting 
     Although there was no significant difference in remember criterion between 
probability conditions across all subjects, there was a great deal of individual 
variability.   To further investigate this, we divided subjects into different groups 
based on how much they shifted their criterion between conditions.  We took the top 
ten subjects who appropriately (i.e. in the right direction) shifted their remember 
criterion between conditions and considered them the ‘high shift group’.  Likewise, 
we took the bottom ten subjects who did not shift at all or shifted in the opposite 
direction between conditions and considered them the ‘low shift group’.  Behaviorally 
speaking, what separated these two groups of subjects from each other was not a 
difference in remember hit rate, but instead a difference in remember false alarm rate.  
The same analysis as above was performed on these groups separately.  When 
recollection was operationalized as the ‘remember hits > know hits’ contrast, no 
lateral parietal regions survived the relatively high threshold (t = 4.3 with N = 10).  
However, when recollection was operationalized as the ‘remember hits > correct 
rejections’ contrast, a striking difference was observed between the ‘high switch 
group’ and ‘low switch group’, specifically within the likely old (70%) condition.  
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Within the ‘high switch group’, lateral parietal activity was relatively robust and 
crossed well below the intraparietal sulcus into areas within the supramarginal gyrus 
(BA 40) and the angular gyrus (BA 39).  For the ‘low switch group’, hardly any 
lateral parietal cortex activity was observed at all, with the relatively small activations 
that were present occurring above the intraparietal sulcus within the superior parietal 
lobule (BA 7).   
       High Switch Group              Low Switch Group 
      
 
 
FIGURE 7: Group-results (p < .001, voxel extent = 10) for Recollection as defined by the ‘Remember 
hits > Correct rejections’ contrast.  Results are shown separately for subjects who switched 
recollection-related criterion (high switch group) and for subjects who did not switch their 
recollection-related criterion (low switch group). 
 
Regions of Interest (ROI) Analysis 
     Percent signal change from (implicit) baseline was calculated for each event type 
for each subject. To calculate the percent signal change associated with  recollection 
and familiarity, the following subtractions were performed:  ‘Remember hits – Know 
hits’ and ‘Know hits – Correct Rejections’, respectively. Figure 8 shows the mean 
(across subjects) percent signal change for these events calculated within the dorsal 
	   96	  
parietal ROI (for familiarity) and ventral parietal ROI (for recollection).  Familiarity 
and recollection-related activity between the likely and unlikely conditions was then 
compared.  Although there was a numerical difference for familiarity-related activity 
within the dorsal ROI (with higher activity during the unlikely condition), results 
from a paired samples t-test showed that this result was not significant, t(23) = -.70, p 
= .491.  Similarly, although there was a numerical difference for recollection-related 
activity within the ventral ROI (with higher activity during the likely condition), 
results from a paired samples t-test revealed that this result was not significant, t(23) 
= .69, p = .497.  When recollection was operationalized by the ‘Remember hits – 
Correct Rejections’ contrast, a paired samples t-test revealed a significant difference, 
with more activity during the likely condition (M = .12, SD = .10) compared to the 
unlikely condition (M = .07, SD = .11), t(23) = 3.41, p = .002.  Further investigation 
into this result revealed no significant difference between the activity to remember 
hits, t(23) = .969, p = .343.  It seems that the result was driven by a significant 
difference in activation to correct rejections, with more activity during the unlikely 
condition (M = -.16, SD = .10) compared to the likely condition (M = -.12, SD = .07), 
t(23) = -.253, p =.019.   
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A.  Recollection-Related Activity 
 
 
 
B.  Correct Rejection-Related Activity 
 
 
 
FIGURE 8:  Mean (across subjects) percent signal change for recollectionA and correct rejectionsB. 
Recollection is operationalized as the ‘remember hits > correct rejections’ contrast and is shown for 
likely and unlikely conditions separately within the functionally-defined ROI.  Activity to correct 
rejections versus baseline is shown for likely and unlikely blocks for both the functionally-defined and 
structurally-defined ROI. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. Significance values are 
indicated with the associated number of stars (p < .05 = *, p < .01 = **). 
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Individual Differences Analysis 
     Particularly because there was a relatively large degree of variability between 
subjects in terms of their memory accuracy (d’) and their criterion setting (c), we 
wanted to see how these behavioral differences related to changes in parietal activity.  
We correlated activity (using the ‘hits > correct rejections’ contrast) within the dorsal 
and ventral parietal ROIs with each subjects’ overall criterion value as well as with 
their overall d’ value.  Results revealed a significant positive correlation between 
dorsal parietal activity and criterion, r(22) = .50, p = .012.  No significant relationship 
was found between dorsal parietal activity and d’, r(22) = .15, p = .50.  For the 
ventral parietal ROI, the reverse pattern was observed.  Results revealed a significant 
positive correlation between ventral parietal activity and d’, r(22) = .628, p = .001, 
while no relationship was found with criterion, r(22) = -.137, p = .522.   
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A.  Familiarity-Related Activity 
 
B.  Recollection-Related Activity 
 
FIGURE 9:  Relationship between the activity in dorsal parietal activity during familiarity (know hits > 
correct rejections) and subjects’ criterionA and the relationship between activity within the ventral 
parietal activity during recollection (remember hits > know hits) and subjects d’B.   
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Discussion 
     In the current experiment, subjects performed a remember/know test under two 
different probability conditions.  In one condition (the likely condition) there was a 
high probability (70%) that items were old, in the other (the unlikely condition) there 
was a low probability (30%) that items were old.  In agreement with previous 
literature (Strack & Forster, 1996; Aminoff et al., 2012, 2014; Van Zandt, 2000, 
Verfaellie et al., 2001; Hirshman & Henzler, 1998), this manipulation had the 
intended effect of changing subjects’ criterion between conditions.  Generally 
speaking, in the likely condition subjects adopted a more liberal criterion setting, 
essentially requiring less mnemonic information in order to endorse an item as old.  
Although this adjustment of criterion was found when collapsed across both 
recognition types and also for familiarity, no significant difference in criterion setting 
was found for responses associated with recollection.  This result is in line with the 
idea that recollection is a threshold process, i.e. one that either occurs fully or not at 
all, and as a result should not be affected by changes in criterion (Mandler, 1980; 
Yonelinas, 1997, 2001).  On the other hand, familiarity is often described by signal 
detection theory as existing as a continuum, one which can be influenced by changes 
in response strategies, including changes in criterion setting (Wixted, 2007; Mickes, 
et al., 2009). 
    However, in the current experiment there was a significant degree of individual 
variability in rates of recollection-related criterion changes between conditions.  
Although most subjects did not vary their recollection response strategies (i.e. 
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criterion) between probability conditions, there were those who did.  For those 
subjects, the difference in response pattern was mostly driven by a change in 
recollected false alarm rates.  Those who shifted their recollection criterion falsely 
endorsed more new items as ‘remembered’ during the likely condition than during the 
unlikely condition.  Therefore there is some evidence that at least for some 
individuals even recollection can be affected by manipulations of probability.  This 
individual variability may explain why there is a disagreement in the literature upon 
whether recollection is or is not affected by manipulations of criterion setting, with 
some results reporting shifts in recollection rates (Strack & Forster, 1995) and others 
not (Postma, 1999; Hirshman & Henzler, 1998).   
     Turning to the neural results reveals a general dorsal/ventral dissociation within 
the lateral parietal cortex for responses associated with familiarity and recollection 
respectively.  Specifically, familiarity-related responses activated the area around the 
intraparietal sulcus and extended dorsally into the superior parietal lobule.  
Recollection-related responses activated areas inferior to the intraparietal sulcus, 
extending into the angular gyrus and supramarginal gyrus.  This general dissociation 
is in line with the first experiment of this dissertation and also with a wealth of 
evidence from the literature (for reviews see Ciaramelli et al., 2008 or Vilberg & 
Rugg, 2008).   
     Although familiarity activated the superior parietal lobule during both the likely 
and unlikely conditions, this activity was stronger and covered a larger cortical area 
during the unlikely compared to the likely condition.  This difference, although not 
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statistically significant, is at least in general agreement with the findings of Aminoff 
et al. (2014) who found more dorsal parietal activity during unlikely compared to 
likely trials.  A highly possible reason for the lack of significance in the current study 
may be due to the smaller behavioral effect.  In the current experiment, the average 
criterion shift for familiarity responses was .18, compared to the whopping .62 
reported in the Aminoff et al. (2004) experiment.  As previously explained, we aimed 
for a higher d’ value in the current study in order to obtain a satisfactory number of 
recollection-related responses.  As a result of an increased d’, subjects relied less on 
the probability information to make their decisions, and therefore shifted their 
criterion to a lesser degree.  With such a low shift amount, it is not surprising that the 
neural results were not statistically significant between conditions in the current 
experiment.  Nevertheless, the fact that there was generally more activity in the dorsal 
parietal areas during the unlikely condition is in agreement with the previous finding 
from Aminoff and colleagues.  Another finding from the current study that is in 
agreement with results from the Aminoff et al. (2014) study is the fact that activity 
within the dorsal parietal cortex was strongly positively correlated with subjects’ 
criterion setting.  This finding suggests that this parietal sub-region may be modulated 
by cognitive processes that are related to top-down attention which may be recruited 
when more stringent monitoring of potential memory content is required (i.e. during a 
time when old items are unlikely).   
     Results associated with recollection-related retrieval showed an opposite pattern of 
results from those associated with familiarity.  The ventral activity observed for the 
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‘remember hits > know hits’ contrast seemed to be greatly driven by the results from 
the likely condition.  When examined separately, a relatively large extent of the 
angular gyrus and supramarginal gyrus was active during recollection in the likely 
condition.  This ventral parietal activity was greatly attenuated when examining 
results from the unlikely condition.  However these results, like those in the dorsal 
areas, did not turn out to be statistically significant and are therefore difficult to 
interpret.  At the very least, there seems to be a general trend that more activity was 
observed in the ventral parietal regions during the likely compared to the unlikely 
condition.  The lack of a significant finding (at least when recollection was 
operationalized by the ‘remember hits > know hits’ contrast) may have to due with 
the low remember criterion shift amount between conditions.  On average, subjects 
shifted their remember criterion a dismal amount of .06 between conditions.  Perhaps 
if a stronger behavioral effect had been observed, a stronger neural result would have 
also been found.  This idea is strengthened by the fact that those who did shift their 
remember criterion (high shift group) had an augmented neural difference between 
conditions, with relatively robust ventral parietal activity during the likely condition, 
while those who did not shift exhibited hardly any activity within this region.   
     Probably the most interesting and unexpected result from this study is the fact that 
activity was the most varied between conditions for responses that were associated 
with correct rejections.  Using both functionally-defined and structurally-defined 
ROIs, results revealed significantly more activity within the ventral parietal areas 
(particularly the angular gyrus) for correct rejections made during the unlikely 
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compared to the likely condition.  These results are consistent with previous reports 
of modified ventral parietal activity to correct rejections based on subjects’ 
expectancies (O’Connor et al., 2010), subjects’ confidence (Cabeza, 2008) with one 
report even showing a reverse old/new effect (greater activity to correct rejections 
than to hits) when new items were relatively infrequent (Jaeger et al., 2013).   
     Collectively these findings are difficult to reconcile with an episodic buffer 
account of parietal activity during memory retrieval.  According to this theory, no 
difference in parietal activity should have been observed between the likely and 
unlikely probability conditions.  Since modulations were found between conditions, 
this provides evidence against an episodic buffer account and suggests instead that 
these parietal activations most likely reflect some extra-mnemonic cognitive 
process(es) that occur during memory retrieval.  
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Chapter 4:  Overall Discussion and Conclusions 
 Summary of Results 
     The purpose of experiment 1 was to directly compare the two most popular 
methods of separating items that are retrieved with familiarity from those recognized 
with recollection.  Those two methods are the remember/know paradigm and tests 
involving source memory.  These methods have been used somewhat interchangeably 
in the literature and have even been described as equivalent methods of separating 
recollection and familiarity during a recognition test (Mark & Rugg, 1998; Rugg et al., 
1998; Yonelinas & Jacoby, 1995).  This claim has been made despite the vast 
differences in task demands associated with each methodology.  For instance, the 
remember/know task is much more subjective and inclusive in what is considered 
evidence for recollection, while the source task is comparably objective and exclusive 
in operationalizing recollection.  Despite this, no experiment has adequately and 
directly compared the neural correlates of recollection and familiarity as 
operationalized by each method.     
      Experiment 1 served as this direct comparison and had the same group of subjects 
complete a remember/know test and a source memory test while their brain 
activations were recorded with fMRI.  Results from both tests showed the ubiquitous 
dorsal/ventral parietal dissociation between familiarity and recollection, respectively.  
Activation relating to familiarity occurred around the left intraparietal sulcus (IPS) 
and extended well into the superior parietal lobule (SPL) during both the 
remember/know and source memory tests. Similarly, regardless of what test was used, 
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recollection-related activity occurred within the ventral parietal regions, activating the 
inferior parietal lobule (IPL), with overlap within the angular gyrus. Although both 
tests revealed this general dissociation, the extent and magnitude of this activation 
varied significantly between testing methodologies.  Specifically, the source task 
activated the dorsal parietal areas to a larger magnitude and extent during familiarity-
related recognition compared to that seen during the remember/know test.  
Conversely, the ventral parietal regions were more activate during recollection as 
operationalized by the remember/know test compared to the source test.  While the 
angular gyrus was active for both tests of recollection, it was significantly more active 
during the remember/know test.  Additionally, the supramarginal gyrus was only 
found to be active when recollection was identified by the remember/know test, with 
activation failing to reach significance during source recollection.   
     The goal of experiment 2 was to test whether ventral parietal regions, like dorsal 
parietal regions, are influenced by changes in criterion setting.  Subjects performed a 
remember/know test under two different probability conditions.  One condition was a 
likely scenario where 70% of the items were from the studied list.  The other 
condition was an unlikely scenario where only 30% of test items were from the 
studied list.  This is the first fMRI experiment to combine the use of a 
remember/know test with changes in the base rates of old and new items.  Behavioral 
results showed that subjects did in fact modify their criterion between conditions 
(albeit a relatively small change), adopting a more liberal criterion during likely 
compared to unlikely trials.  When responses were looked at separately for trials 
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associated with familiarity and recollection, it was evident that this criterion change 
was driven mostly by changes in familiarity-based criterion.  That is, responses made 
with familiarity were the most sensitive to changes in the probability of the item 
being from the study list, with recollection-related responses left relatively unaffected.  
This difference in influence upon familiarity and recollection is in line with previous 
accounts of recollection being a threshold process, impervious to changes in response 
strategies (Mandler, 1980; Yonelinas, 1997, 2001), while familiarity is based on a 
continuum of mnemonic evidence that is heavily reliant on decision-based strategies 
the subject may employ (Wixted, 2007; Mickes, et al., 2009).   
      Neural activity within the lateral parietal cortex associated with recollection and 
familiarity were investigated separately.  As in experiment 1, the ubiquitous 
dorsal/ventral parietal dissociation was found for items recovered with familiarity and 
recollection.  Results from these contrasts were then compared between the likely and 
unlikely testing conditions.  Although no statistically significant difference was found 
between the conditions, a general trend was that there was more familiarity-related 
activity in the dorsal parietal areas during the unlikely condition while there was more 
recollection-related activity in the ventral parietal areas during the likely condition.  
This ventral parietal difference was found to be significant when recollection was 
operationalized by comparing activity during hits made with a remember response to 
activity made when items were correctly rejected.  Specifically, an area within the 
angular gyrus was found to be more active during recollection in the likely condition.   
     A somewhat unexpected result from this experiment was the modulation of ventral 
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parietal activity (particularly within the angular gyrus) when correct rejections were 
made.  Correct rejections made during unlikely testing conditions activated this 
region to a larger magnitude than correct rejections made during likely conditions.  
This region is usually found to be active when memories are successfully retrieved, 
and it is thought to be involved with this retrieval process – either directly by 
temporarily storing the retrieved content (episodic buffer theory) or by contributing to 
some cognitive process (e.g. attention) that is engaged when content is retrieved.  
Since by definition, no memory content is being actively retrieved when correct 
rejections are made, it is somewhat surprising that this area was found to be 
modulated by whether or not new test items were likely to be encountered.   
     Finally, results from the ROI analysis showed significant relationships between 
activity within the parietal areas and behavioral performance on the memory test.  
How these relationships manifested depended on what part of the parietal cortex was 
measured.  Specifically, dorsal parietal activity was found to be positively correlated 
with subjects’ criterion setting, but no relationship was found for subjects’ memory 
accuracy.  On the other hand, ventral parietal activity was found to be positively 
correlated with subjects’ memory accuracy with no correlation evident with criterion 
setting.   
 
Relation to Theories of Parietal Theories 
     As outlined in the introduction of this dissertation, there exists a variety of theories 
to explain how lateral parietal activity relates to successful memory retrieval.  The 
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biggest divide in the literature is whether this region is directly related to memory 
retrieval or whether it is involved with some extra-memory process that co-occurs 
with successful retrieval.  The episodic buffer theory maintains that the parietal cortex 
is directly related to memory retrieval in that it acts as a temporary storage area for 
recovered episodic content (Wagner, 2005, Vilberg & Rugg, 2008).  According to this 
account, this region acts much like the working memory buffers proposed within the 
prefrontal cortex by Baddeley (2000), storing information until a decision can be 
made.  Others argue that the parietal cortex is not directly related to memory 
processes, but instead indirectly related by fostering some cognitive process that aids 
in successful memory retrieval, but is not necessary for it to occur.  These theories 
include modulating top-down and bottom-up attention to retrieved memory content, 
accumulating mnemonic evidence of an ‘old’ response, and maintaining a sense of 
self-awareness and ownership of the contents of one’s memories.   
     While the results of the current experiments cannot definitively explain what 
function the lateral parietal cortex is playing during memory retrieval, they seem to be 
the least consistent with the theory of an episodic buffer account.  The results from 
the first experiment revealed a modulation of activation within both the dorsal and 
ventral parietal regions depending on what methodology was used to identify 
recollection and familiarity. This modulation is difficult for the episodic buffer theory 
to explain.  While there is no reason to believe that these different methodologies 
should trigger a difference in the amount of information retrieved, they may have 
differed in the cognitive demands that were required for successful retrieval to occur.   
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     Some of the processes suggested for the dorsal parietal area include: a modulation 
of top-down attention (Cabeza, 2008; Cabeza et al., 2008; Cabeza, Ciaramelli, & 
Moscovitch, 2012; Ciaramelli et al., 2008), retrieval orienting (Dobbins & Wagner, 
2005; O’Connor, et al., 2010; Jaeger, et al., 2013), and the conservativeness of the 
subject’s criterion (Aminoff et al., 2014). Although all three of these cognitive 
processes should occur during both the remember/know and source memory tests, one 
could argue that these processes may be in higher demand during the source memory 
test.  While the results from this study cannot directly compare these competing 
theories, they go along with the general idea that source decisions as compared to 
remember/know decisions may result in additional cognitive processing.  For instance, 
the very act of attempting to retrieve a specific contextual detail (as is required in the 
source test) has been shown to increase activity within the lateral parietal cortex.  
Specifically, simply orienting towards this type of source-related retrieval, even when 
it is not successful, has led to increased activity levels in the dorsal parietal regions, 
compared to when standard recognition is attempted (Dobbins & Wagner, 2005; 
Dobbins, Rice, Wagner, & Schacter, 2003).  Additionally, source memory responses, 
as compared to remember/know decisions, may require an increase in top-down 
attention in order to navigate through the contents of memory to find that specific 
piece of contextual information. While remember responses can be made based on the 
retrieval of any contextual information, source responses are dependent upon the 
retrieval of specific contextual information.  As described by Ciaramelli et al. (2008), 
this information may not be the first that pops into the subject’s mind, and therefore, 
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may have to be strategically searched for.  This often effortful search may require 
additional resources from ancillary cortical areas that may control functions such as 
top-down attention (Cabeza, 2008; Cabeza et al., 2008; Cabeza et al., 2012; 
Ciaramelli et al., 2008) or the orienting towards such types of associative retrieval 
(Dobbins & Wagner, 2005; O’Connor, et al., 2010; Jaeger, et al., 2013).  This may be 
why some previous studies have shown additional activity in posterior parietal and 
prefrontal cortices when comparing source judgments to remember responses (Duarte, 
Ranganath, & Knight, 2005; Ciaramelli et al., 2008).   
     Numerous studies have shown that activity levels within the dorsal parietal cortex 
increases as the difficulty in memory search increases (Cabeza, 2008; Ciaramelli et al., 
2008; Kim & Cabeza, 2007; Henson et al., 2005).  In the current study, hits made 
during the source task took a significantly longer amount of time to make compared 
to hits made during the remember/know task (both for recollection and familiarity) 
suggesting that some additional cognitive processing was occurring during this test. 
Although we can’t make claims as to what specific cognitive process(es) may be 
occurring during the source test, the fact that a greater level of activity was found in 
the dorsal parietal regions is consistent with the idea that some additional processing 
is occurring in this test that is not occurring during the remember/know test.  
     Some proponents of the episodic buffer theory have argued that this account only 
pertains to the more ventral sub-regions of the lateral parietal cortex.  Even if this 
modification of the theory is applied, it is still hard to reconcile with the results from 
experiment 1.  The modulation of parietal activity was not confined to areas within 
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the dorsal parietal areas, but extended well past the intraparietal sulcus into the more 
ventral sub-regions of this cortical region.  In contrast to the dorsal modulation, 
ventral parietal regions were more active during recollection as operationalized by the 
remember/know task compared to the source task.  Again, there is no reason why a 
difference in the amount of episodic content should vary between testing 
methodologies, so this result is difficult for the episodic buffer theory to explain.  
Even if one were to argue that there should be a difference in amount of retrieved 
episodic content, if anything, the results should have been the opposite in order to fit 
with a buffer account.  As Vilberg and Rugg have previously argued (2006, 2007), 
there may be more episodic content retrieved with recollected memories identified by 
the source task compared to the remember/know task.  Their rational is as follows: 
there is no reason to assume that source recollections do not have so called ‘non-
criterial’ episodic content associated with them that would be relevant for the source 
task.  In other words, if a subject is able to retrieve the specific piece of source 
information, they most likely are also able to retrieve additional contextual 
information from the study episode that is not relevant to the source task.  On the 
other hand, one cannot assume that just because any piece of contextual information 
is retrieved (as recollection is operationalized by the remember/know task) that the 
specific source information is also retrieved.  According to this logic, source 
recollections should contain more episodic content than remember/know recollection.  
If this is the case, then according to the episodic buffer theory, more not less, ventral 
parietal activity should have been revealed by the source test.  The very same 
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argument could be used against a mnemonic accumulator theory of parietal activity.  
If anything, this theory should predict more activity during the source task because 
the more content that is retrieved, the more an ‘oldness’ signal there is to be accrued.     
     On the other hand, increased remember/know recollection-related activity is much 
more parsimonious with theories that suggest an indirect role of parietal involvement 
in memory retrieval.  Of all the indirect theories, the one that best fits with these 
results is the subjective awareness account.  As previously described, the 
remember/know test is much more subjective in its operationalization of recollection 
as compared to the source task.  The retrieval of any contextual information is 
relevant for the remember/know task.  Such information may include 
autobiographical memories (e.g. previous memories that the subject associated with 
the particular word) or self-referential processing (e.g. “I remember what I was 
thinking about when I saw that word on the study list”) that would be sufficient to 
make a remember but not a source response. According to the subjective awareness 
account of parietal activity, this type of information should activate the parietal 
regions.  Since this information is not relevant to source recollection, the fact that 
activity within this region was attenuated during the source task is in agreement with 
the general predictions of the subjective awareness explanation of parietal activity.   
     Results from experiment 2 are also difficult to reconcile with an episodic buffer 
account of parietal activity.  Again, according to this theory, no difference in 
retrieval-related parietal activity should have been found between likely and unlikely 
conditions.  Contrary to this, a general trend revealed higher activation levels within 
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the dorsal parietal cortex during familiarity-related retrieval in the unlikely condition, 
and higher activation within the ventral parietal cortex during recollection-related 
retrieval in the likely condition.  If any difference in episodic content were to be 
expected, then one might be able to argue that more content should be retrieved 
during the unlikely condition.  During this condition, subjects are not expecting to 
encounter many studied test items, and as a result, they behaviorally shifted their 
criterion to a more conservative level.  Effectively this means that only memories 
with a higher level of episodic content will surpass this conservative criterion setting 
and be considered ‘old’.  If this were the case, then memories successfully identified 
as old during the unlikely condition should have a higher degree of episodic content 
than those endorsed as ‘old’ during the likely condition. The same rationale could be 
used for a mnemonic accumulator theory (e.g. stronger memories in the unlikely 
condition should lead to stronger ‘oldness’ signals). As previously described, the 
opposite pattern of results were found within the ventral parietal regions (the area 
suggested as an episodic buffer), suggesting something other than an episodic buffer 
explanation.   
     Furthermore, when subjects were split into groups based on whether they shifted 
their remember criterion or not, this difference in ventral parietal activity was 
augmented.  Those who effectively switched their recollection criterion showed 
extensive ventral parietal activity, while those who did not, showed hardly any ventral 
activation at all.  Behaviorally, these two groups differed in their recollection memory 
accuracy.  Specifically, those who shifted had a significantly lower recollection d’ 
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than those who did not.  This difference was mostly due to an increase in the 
occurrence of incorrectly recollecting a non-studied item (i.e. false alarm).  If an 
episodic buffer account is used to explain this activity, then the group with the higher 
d’ should have shown greater parietal activity, not less.   
     Instead, the results from experiment 2 are more in line with those from experiment 
1.  The dorsal parietal regions were more active when subjects most likely had to 
engage more top-down attentional resources to monitor retrieved content when it 
should not have been expected (i.e. during the unlikely condition).  When subjects 
increase their criterion setting, they are requiring more mnemonic evidence to 
override a prepotent ‘new’ response.  In fact, activity within this dorsal parietal region 
was shown to be positively correlated with subjects’ criterion level.  The more 
carefully a subject was monitoring this unexpected memory information, the more the 
dorsal parietal cortex was recruited.  This finding is in agreement with the previous 
study by Aminoff et al. (2014) showing a similar positive relationship between 
criterion setting and dorsal parietal activation levels.     
     The finding of increased ventral parietal activity during the likely condition is not 
only difficult to reconcile with an episodic buffer account, but it also conflicts with 
predictions made by a bottom-up attention account of ventral parietal activity.  
According to this theory, ventral parietal activity should have been maximal when 
mnemonic information was retrieved unexpectedly.  Proponents of this theory have 
claimed that the bottom-up attentional system is maximally engaged when items are 
infrequent, much like during ‘odd-ball’ tasks in the perception literature (for a review 
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see Corbetta & Shulman, 2002).  When memories are unexpectedly retrieved, the 
bottom-up attention system is supposed to act as a circuit-breaker, reorienting internal 
attention to the unexpected information (for a review see Cabeza et al., 2008).  
According to this theory then, the ventral parietal cortex should have been maximally 
active during the unlikely condition.  As previously described, the opposite pattern of 
results was revealed, with relatively greater activity within the ventral parietal regions 
during the likely condition.   
     It is somewhat unclear to predict what results should have been revealed according 
to the subjective awareness account of ventral parietal activity.  However, the 
reported results are not in conflict with this explanation.  It wouldn’t be too much of a 
stretch to imagine that subjects are less inquisitive of their mnemonic information 
during the likely condition.  After all, they are expecting items to be from the studied 
list.  Therefore, they may be more inclined to believe whatever mnemonic 
information is retrieved and to experience a subjective feeling of ‘oldness’ associated 
with these memories as a result.   Subjects may be more cautious of items seen during 
the unlikely condition and may be more hesitant to trust any feelings of oldness that 
could be experienced.   This cautiousness may inhibit subjects from entertaining 
subjective feelings of remembrance.  Although no significant difference in the 
number of remember hits was found between conditions, subjects were significantly 
slower in making these responses during the unlikely condition.  This provides some 
evidence that subjects were more hesitant in their recollection responses during the 
unlikely compared to the likely condition.   
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      The finding of a modulation of activity between conditions for items that were 
correctly rejected is the most difficult to reconcile with an episodic buffer account.  
By definition, correct rejections have no episodic content, and therefore no difference 
should be found between probability conditions according to a buffer explanation.  
This finding is also difficult to reconcile with a bottom-up attention account of ventral 
activity.  According to this theory, correct rejections should have activated this region 
to a larger degree during the likely condition since new items were more infrequent 
during this condition.  In fact, the opposite pattern of results were observed, with 
greater activity to correct rejections within the angular gyrus during the unlikely 
condition.  
     Once again, it is difficult to predict what results would have been predicted to 
correct rejections according to the subjective awareness account of parietal activity.  
However, the subjective awareness account is less tied to memory content than the 
episodic buffer account.  A feeling of subjective awareness and increased confidence 
can occur when subjects correctly reject items, especially when done so in a condition 
that encourages those responses.  In fact, a previous study by Cabeza (2008) found 
that regions within the ventral parietal cortex were maximally activated not only 
when hits were made with high confidence, but also when correct rejections were 
made with high confidence.  Although these results were interpreted in terms of a 
bottom-up attention account, they could just as easily be explained by a subjective 
awareness account.  In the current study, the rate of correct rejections was not only 
higher in the unlikely condition, but these responses were made significantly faster 
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than correct rejections in the likely condition.  Therefore, it is reasonable to believe 
that subjects were more confident in their correct rejections during the unlikely 
condition.   
     The ventral parietal activity to successful memory retrieval (operationalized as the 
‘hits > correct rejections’ contrast) was found to be positively correlated with subjects’ 
memory accuracy (measured as d’).  This type of relationship is usually discussed as 
evidence of this region acting as an episodic buffer (Vilberg & Rugg, 2008).  The 
rationale is that the stronger one’s ability is to discriminate old items from new items, 
the more episodic content they should be retrieving to those items correctly identified 
as old.  While this reasoning makes sense, episodic content is not the only 
phenomenon associated with strongly identified old items.  A mnemonic accumulator 
account would suggest that those who have better discrimination rates would also 
have a higher accumulation of an ‘oldness’ signal.  Likewise, one could argue that 
those who are better discriminators might have stronger memories that would be more 
salient and more successful at reorienting attentional systems to this retrieved content.  
Finally, if this region’s activation were representing subjective awareness of the 
retrieved memory content, it would also make sense that this area would be 
maximally activated with stronger memories.  Therefore, this finding cannot help us 
to distinguish which one of these theories (if any) of parietal activity is correct, but 
instead goes along with all of the accounts.   In order to truly appreciate the results 
from these experiments, it is necessary to look to the patient literature and understand 
what memory retrieval is like for patients who have damaged this region of the brain.   
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Relation to Neuropsychology Results 
     The lack of a severe memory impairment of parietal lobe patients is the most 
difficult to reconcile with an episodic buffer account of parietal activations during 
memory retrieval.  If this region were truly directly involved with memory retrieval 
and acting as a temporary storage site for retrieved episodic content, then these 
patients should exhibit more extreme memory impairments, perhaps resembling 
amnesic patients with medial temporal lobe damage.  Instead, the deficits exhibited 
by parietal patients are much less extreme, with only subtle differences in 
performance being reported if at all (Hunkin et al., 1995; Ally et al., 2008; Davidson 
et al., 2008; Berryhill et al., 2009; Drowos et al., 2010; Simons et al., 2010; for a 
review see Berryhill, 2012).  This type of subdued impairment is more consistent with 
the idea that this brain region is functioning as some extra-mnemonic process that 
guides memory processes but is not necessary for it to occur.   
     Probably the most popular theory of ventral parietal activation is the idea that this 
region is modulating changes in bottom-up attention (for a reviews see Cabeza et al., 
2008; Cabeza, 2008).  Results to support this claim come from a study by Berryhill 
and colleagues (2007).	  	  They described ventral parietal lobe patients who experienced 
recollections that lacked richness and specificity when they were asked to freely 
recall memories.  Curiously, these same patients were able to access these memories 
when they were explicitly probed about them.  This led the authors to explain their 
results in terms of the dual attentional processes hypothesis. Their reasoning is as 
follows: the damage in these patients was relatively limited to the ventral parietal 
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regions, thus according to the dual attentional processes hypothesis, only bottom-up 
attention should be affected with top-down allocation of attention left relatively intact.  
Since the patients were able to use explicit memory cues to retrieve memory content 
(ostensibly using top-down attention) but were unable to retrieve those same 
memories spontaneously via free recall (ostensibly using bottom-up attention), they 
believe their results were in line with this hypothesis.  They likened this inability to 
use bottom-up attention to cue memory retrieval to a ‘memory neglect syndrome’, 
much like parietal patients who experience visual neglect and cannot use exogenous 
cues to orient attention towards visual stimuli (Bisiach & Luzzatti, 1978).  Additional 
support of an attentional account of ventral parietal activity comes from a study by 
Ciaramelli et al. (2010).  In this study, parietal patients were scanned while 
performing a recognition memory test.  During the study sessions, words were 
presented in pairs and at test, pairs of words were shown one at a time.  For most of 
the trials, the word was presented with the same word associate as during the study 
session.  Therefore, this word served as a cue, initiating a search through one’s 
memory storage to retrieve the associated word pair.  Controls were able to use this 
information to enhance their memory performance, responding quicker than non-cued 
trials, and also showed increased dorsal parietal activation during this cued search 
phase.  Dorsal parietal patients on the other hand, were not able to incorporate this 
information into their memory responses and showed no difference in response time 
between cued and uncued trials.  On the other hand, some trials were paired with the 
wrong word associate.  These trials were designed to engage the bottom-up attention 
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system by surprising the subject with an unexpected word.  Control subjects showed 
increased ventral parietal activity during these trials while ventral parietal patients 
had difficulty recognizing these invalidly cued words.  The authors argued that the 
distinct deficits occurring for dorsal vs. ventral parietal patients provided strong 
evidence in support of a dual-attentional account of parietal activity during memory 
retrieval. 
     The other theory that has been garnering more attention in the memory literature is 
the idea that parietal activations are representing the subjective experience associated 
with memories that are confidently retrieved.  If all of the results from parietal 
patients are reviewed, the most common finding is that patients are less confident in 
their memories (Hunkin et al., 1995; Ally et al., 2008; Davidson et al., 2008; Berryhill 
et al., 2009; Drowos et al., 2010; Simons et al., 2010; for a review see Berryhill, 
2012).  Although patients can often report the content of their memories accurately, 
they are often experienced as less vivid, and devoid of rich contextual detail 
(Berryhill et al. 2007; Davidson et al. 2008; Simons et al. 2008).  Additionally, 
parietal patients have shown diminished reports of remember/know recollection, 
while leaving source recollection relatively in tact (Drowos et al. 2010; Duarte et al., 
2008).  Interesting, patient S.M. reported by Davidson and colleagues (2008) reported 
that she could recall events of her life but that her memories did not seem to be 
accompanied by a sense of having experienced the event herself.  All of these reports 
seem to point to a preserved ability to recall the contents of episodic memory, but 
with an impaired subjective experience of those same memories.  	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Concluding Remarks 
     While it is not yet clear what functional role (if any) the lateral parietal cortex is 
playing during successful memory retrieval, it seems unlikely that it is acting as an 
episodic buffer, temporarily storing retrieved episodic content.  Not only is this 
account difficult to reconcile from the results presented in this dissertation, but it is 
also unable to explain the findings from neuropsychology.  It appears much more 
likely that parietal activations during memory retrieval are representing some extra-
mnemonic process that may help memory retrieval but is not necessary for it to occur.  
The theory that is the most parsimonious with the results from this dissertation and 
from neuropsychology is that activity within this brain region is somehow related to 
the subjective experience that is associated with particularly strong memories.  
However, this account cannot explain all of the neuroimaging and neuropsychology 
evidence and it is likely to not be the only explanation that is valid.  Another favored 
theory is that this region is representing changes to top-down and bottom-up attention 
systems, much like it does during perceptual tasks.  Given the extreme heterogeneity 
of the lateral parietal cortex it is likely that multiple theories may be needed to 
explain the activity within this area.  In fact, several lines of recent research has 
suggested that more precise segregations of the parietal cortex may reveal different 
functional roles depending on where exactly the activity is located.  This research 
includes results from diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) techniques (Caspers, Eickhoff, 
Rick, von Kapri, Kuhl, Huang, Shah, & Zilles., 2011), studies measuring functional-
connectivity (Cohen, Fair, Dosenbach, Miezin, Dierker, Van Essen, Schlagger, & 
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Petersen, 2008; Daselaar, Huijbers, Eklund, Moscovitch, & Cabeza, 2013; Nelson, 
Cohen, Power, Wig, Miezin, Wheeler, Velanova, Donaldson, Phillips, Schlaggar, & 
Peterson, 2010), and meta-analyses of fMRI reports (Hutchinson et al., 2009).  This 
idea that the parietal cortex may be playing various functional roles during memory 
retrieval is likely to explain the somewhat mixed results that have been reported thus 
far in the literature.  Going forward, more specified sub-regions within both the dorsal 
and ventral lateral parietal areas should be targeted in order to better understand the 
complex workings of this cortical area.   
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Appendix 
 
Remember/Know Instructions: 
You will be presented with a series of words. Half of the words shown will be from 
the study list, the other half will be new words. By ‘study list’, I mean the four lists of 
words you initially saw, and made either an ‘Abstract/Concrete’ or 
‘Pleasant/Unpleasant’ decision on.   
For each word, please respond with either a “Remember”, “Know”, or “New” 
response.   Each word will be on the screen for about 3 seconds.  
A “Remember” response should be made when you recognize the word and can 
consciously recollect its prior occurrence in the study list. “Remember” is the ability 
to become consciously aware again of some aspect or aspects of what happened or 
what was experienced at the time the word was presented (e.g., aspects of the 
physical appearance of the word, or of something that happened in the room, or of 
what you were thinking and doing at the time).  In other words, the “remembered” 
word should bring back to mind a particular association, image, or something more 
personal from the time of study, or something about its appearance or position (i.e., 
what came before or after that word).  Please indicate a “remember” response by 
pressing button number 1 – the button all the way to the left under your index finger. 
A “Know” response should be made when you recognize the word from the study list, 
but you cannot consciously recollect anything about its actual occurrence or what 
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happened or what was experienced at the time of its occurrence.  In other words, 
respond with a “K” (for “know”) when you are quite certain of recognizing the word, 
but the word fails to evoke a specific conscious recollection from the study list. 
Please indicate a “know” response by pressing button number 2 – the button under 
your middle finger. 
I want to emphasize that the difference between a “Remember” response and a 
“Know” response is NOT merely a difference in confidence.  In both cases, you are 
quite certain that the word was on the study list.  The different responses reflect a 
different kind of memory EXPERIENCE.  A “Remember” response should bring you 
back to the time you encountered the word during the study session – almost as if you 
are re-experiencing that event.  A “Know” response does not have this kind of 
experience, but instead reflects a sense of familiarity in the absence of contextual 
details. 
A “New” response means that you do not think that the word was on the study list.  
You have no awareness of the word being shown previously.  Please indicate this 
response by pressing button number 3 with your ring finger.     
 
 
 
